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PREFACE 
  
The Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements document has been prepared for use by 
designers of battery-powered vehicles, portable equipment, and experiments intended for crewed 
spaceflight.  The purpose of the requirements document is to provide battery designers with 
information on design provisions to be incorporated in and around the battery and on the 
verification to be undertaken to demonstrate a safe battery is provided.  The term "safe battery" 
means that the battery is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and use; safe to 
be used in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle; and safe to be mounted or used 
in unpressurized spaces adjacent to habitable areas. 
 
Battery design review, approval, and certification is required before the batteries can be used for 
ground operations and be certified for flight.   
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CREWED SPACE VEHICLE 
BATTERY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
 
This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, 
payload, and crew equipment batteries.  It defines the specific provisions required to design a 
battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all 
applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed 
space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to 
the habitable portion of a space vehicle.  The required provisions encompass hazard controls, 
design evaluation, and verification.  The extent of the hazard controls and verification required 
depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and 
applicable missions under review.  Evaluation of the design and verification program results 
shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. 
 
This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in 
crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems 
and payloads (or experiments).  This requirements document also applies to ground handling and 
testing of flight batteries.  Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are 
dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and 
application.  The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-
powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements 
pertinent to the specific battery application.  However, there are basic requirements for all battery 
designs and applications, which are listed in section 4.  Section 5 includes a description of 
hazards and controls and also includes requirements.   
 
The following definitions differentiate between requirements and other statements. 
 
Shall:   This is the only verb used for binding requirements.  
Should/May:  These verbs are used for stating non-mandatory goals or when used in the 
italicized text herein refer to best practice methods which can be construed as 
example methods for meeting the requirement it refers to. 
Will:   This verb is used for stating facts or declaration of purpose.  
 
Section 6 includes chemistry-specific information.  No requirements appear in that section, only best 
practices. 
 
Shall requirements are summarized in Appendix E. 
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In keeping with the NASA standards template, italicized text is intended to indicate rationale, best 
practice examples, or guidelines; while the italicized text never includes the requirement, it often 
helps to convey the intent of the requirement.  
 
In cases where a requirement includes associated italicized text and that text includes best practice, 
that best practice can be considered part of an accepted means to address the requirement.  If other 
methods are used, rationale and supporting data demonstrating the adequacy of those methods 
should be presented and must be reviewed for adequacy by the program’s technical team..   
 
1.2 Responsibility and Change Authority 
 
The responsibility for the development of this document lies with the Propulsion and Power 
Division at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC).  Change authority resides with the Propulsion 
and Power Division. 
 
1.3 Battery Design Evaluation and Approval 
 
To be compliant to the requirements herein, every battery design, along with its safety 
verification program, its ground and/or on-orbit usage plans, and its post-flight processing shall 
be evaluated and approved by the appropriate technical review panel in the given program or 
project.  Center and program specific examples of the review and approval process can be found 
in Appendix D. 
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2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
 
2.1 Applicable Documents 
 
Document 
Number 
Document Title 
JPR 1700.1 JSC Safety and Health Handbook 
JSC-STD- 8080 JSC Design and Procedural Standards  
JSC 25159 Toxicological Hazard Assessments on Batteries used in Space 
Shuttle Missions 
JSC 63322 Packaging Requirements for Launch, On-Orbit Storage and 
Disposal of Batteries 
JSC 66548 Requirements for Flight Certification and Acceptance of 
Commercial Off the Shelf Lithium Ion Batteries  
49 CFR 173.185 Lithium Cells and Batteries 
JWI 8705.3 Battery Processing 
SSP 52005 Rev. C Payload Flight Equipment Requirements and Guidelines for 
Safety-Critical Structures 
SSP 50021 Safety Requirements for ISS Program 
SSP 41172 Qualification and Acceptance Environmental Test Requirements 
for Space Station 
NASA-STD-5019 Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware 
ANSI/AIAA  
S-080-1998 
Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized 
Structures, and Pressure Components 
NPR 8705.2B Human Rating Requirements and Guidelines for Space Flight 
Systems 
NSTS 1700.7B 
ISS Addendum 
Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the 
International Space Station 
AWS 
C7.4/C7.4M:2008 
Process Specification and Operator Qualification for Laser Beam 
Welding 
NASA-STD-5020  Requirements for Threaded Fastening Systems in Spaceflight 
Hardware 
PRC-0009D Resistance Spot Welding of Battery and Electronic Assemblies 
UL 840 Insulation Coordination Including Clearances and Creepage 
Distances for Electrical Equipment 
NASA-STD-
8739.4 
Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harnesses, and Wiring 
J-STD-001ES Space Applications Electronic Hardware Addendum to  
J-STD-001E 
NASA-STD-
8739.1A 
Workmanship Standard for Polymeric Application on Electronic 
Assemblies 
JPR 8730.1 Electrostatic Discharge Control Requirements for the Protection 
of Electronic Components and Assemblies 
IPC-6012C-2010 Qualification and Performance Specification for Rigid Printed 
Boards 
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2.2 Reference Documents 
  
This section lists those documents that may aid in the understanding or clarification of the 
specification.  
 
Document 
Number 
Document Title 
JSC 28484 Program Requirements Document for Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Non-critical 
Hardware 
JSC 26626A EVA Hardware Generic Design Requirements 
JSC 26549 JSC Manual for Control of Program Stock 
JSC 26943 Guidelines for the Preparation of Payload Flight Safety Data 
Packages and Hazard Reports 
JSC 61360 Engineering Directorate Certified Parts Approval Process 
(EDCPAP)  
EP-WI-031 Cell Acceptance Requirements for Li-ion COTS Cells 
SMC-S-016 Test Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage and Space Vehicles 
JSC 66217 
Specification for Lot Testing and Flight Screening of Canon 
BP 927 and BP 930 Lithium-ion Batteries 
EP-WI-014  
Rev. B 
Specification for Acceptance Testing of Commercial Nickel 
Metal Hydride (NiMH) and Nickel Cadmium (NiCd) Cells  
ISS_EP -03 EP5 Battery Design Evaluation Form 
Form 1230 Flight Payload Standardized Hazard Control Report 
ESTA-OP-049 
Ver. D 
Lithium Battery Handler Certification 
P32928-103 Requirements For International Partner Cargoes Transported on 
Russian Progress and Soyuz Vehicles 
JSC 50835A ISS Pressurized Volume Hardware Common Interface 
Requirements Document 
NESC-RP-08-
00492  
Assessment of Risks and Mitigation Strategies for the use of 
Lithium-ion (Li-ion) Long Life Batteries (LLB) 
MSFC-STD-531 High Voltage Design Guide 
JSC 29129 STS Orbiter Upgrades Program – Electrical Auxiliary Power Unit 
(EAPU) Corona Design Guideline 
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2.3 Order of Precedence 
 
This is a safety requirements document.  Wherever there is conflict between this and reference 
documents, the following hierarchy applies: 
 
1. Program-level documentation/specifications (International Space Station (ISS), 
Commercial Crew, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), etc.) 
2. JSC Engineering Directorate documentation/specifications 
3. This document 
4. Any other document/specification cited herein 
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3. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
3.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
A amperes (current) 
AC Alternating Current 
Ag/Zn Silver-zinc 
AgO Silver (II) oxide 
Ag2O silver (I) oxide or monovalent silver oxide 
Ah ampere-hour 
ARC Accelerating Rate Calorimetry 
AVT Acceptance Vibration Test 
°C degrees Centigrade 
CCV Closed Circuit Voltage 
Cd(OH)2 Cadmium hydroxide 
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment 
CID Current Interrupt Device 
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf 
C rate or C Charge/discharge rate based on the nameplate capacity of the cell 
CT Computed Tomography 
DC Direct Current 
DFMR Design for Minimum Risk 
DoD Depth of Discharge 
DoT Department of Transportation 
DPA Destructive Physical Analysis 
ESTA Energy Systems Test Area 
°F degrees Fahrenheit 
G Gravitational Constant 
g
2
/Hz Measurement of Vibration Amplitude 
GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
HAZMAT Hazardous Material 
ISS International Space Station 
JF JSC Form 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KOH Potassium hydroxide 
LEL Lower Exposure Limit 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
Li-BCX  Lithium-bromine chloride complex 
LiBOB Lithium bisoxalato borate 
LiBF4 Lithium tetrafluoroborate 
LiCFx Lithium polycarbon monofluoride 
LiFeS2 Lithium iron disulfide 
Li-MnO2 Lithium manganese dioxide 
LiPF6 Lithium hexafluorophosphate   
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Li-SO2 Lithium-sulfur dioxide 
Li-SO2Cl2 Lithium-sulfuryl chloride 
Li-SOCl2  Lithium-thionyl chloride 
Li-ion Lithium-ion 
mAh milliamp-hours 
MCMB Mesophase Carbon Micro Beads 
MOSFET Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor 
MPLM Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet 
NDE Nondestructive Evaluation 
NiCd Nickel-cadmium 
NiH2 Nickel-hydrogen 
NiMH Nickel-metal hydride 
NiOOH Nickel oxyhydroxide 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement 
NSTS National Space Transportation System 
OCV Open Circuit Voltage 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
PAN Polyacrylonitriles 
PbO2 Lead dioxide 
PSRP Payload Safety Review Panel 
PTC Positive Temperature Coefficient 
PVC Polyvinyl chloride 
PVDF Polyvinylidene Di-fluoride 
QVT Qualification Vibration Testing 
SLA Sealed Lead Acid 
SO2 Sulfur dioxide 
SOC State of Charge 
SRP ISS Safety Review Panel 
SSRP Shuttle Safety Review Panel 
STS Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle) 
UL Underwriters Laboratory 
V Voltage, in volts 
VRLA Vent Regulated Lead Acid 
Wh watt-hour 
 
3.2 Definitions 
 
Activation:  The process of making an assembled cell functional, either by introducing an 
electrolyte, by immersing the cell into an electrolyte, or by any other means dictated by the cell 
manufacturer. 
 
Active material:  The material contained in the electrodes of a cell or battery that takes part in the 
electrochemical reactions of charge and discharge. 
 
Aging:  Permanent loss of capacity due to repeated cycling or passage of time during nonuse. 
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Anode – (negative electrode):  Gives up electrons to external circuit and is oxidized during the 
electrochemical reaction of discharge. 
 
Available capacity:  The total capacity, ampere-hour (Ah) or watt-hour (Wh), that will be 
obtained from a cell or battery at defined discharge rates and other specified discharge or 
operating conditions (including temperatures). 
 
Battery (also termed battery pack):  Interconnected modules, including all ancillary subsystems 
for mechanical support, thermal management, and electronic control. 
 
C rate:  The discharge or charge current, in amperes, expressed as a multiple of the rated capacity 
in ampere hours. 
 
Capacity:  The total number of ampere-hours or watt-hours that can be withdrawn from a fully 
charged cell or battery under specified conditions of discharge. 
 
Catastrophic failure mode: An event that results in the death or permanent disability of a crew 
member or passenger, or an event results in the unplanned loss/destruction of a major element of 
the crewed space system that could potentially result in the death or permanent disability of a 
crew member or passenger. 
 
Cathode – (positive electrode):  Accepts electrons from the circuit and is reduced during the 
electrochemical reaction of discharge. 
 
Cell (also termed battery cell):  An assembly of at least one positive electrode, one negative 
electrode, and other necessary electrochemical and structural components.  A cell is a self-
contained energy storage device whose function is to deliver electrical energy to an external 
circuit. 
 
Cell bank:  A grouping of interconnected cells in a parallel arrangement, into a single mechanical 
and electrical unit. 
 
Charge acceptance:  The willingness of a battery or cell to accept charge.  It may be affected by 
cell temperature, charge rate, and state of charge (SOC). 
 
Closed circuit voltage (CCV):  The difference in potential between the terminals of a cell or the 
voltage measured when the circuit is under an electrical load. 
 
Concentration polarization:  Polarization caused by the depletion of ions in the electrolyte at the 
surface of the electrode. 
 
Conditioning:  Cyclic charging and discharging of a battery to ensure that it is fully formed and 
fully charged.  Also carried out when a battery is first placed into service or returned to service 
after prolonged storage. In some cases, this may involve deep discharging as in the case of NiCd 
or NiMH. 
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Cutoff voltage:  The cell or battery voltage at which the discharge is terminated.  Also called end 
voltage. 
 
COTS battery:  Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) battery designed to power 
commercially available (or COTS) equipment.  Examples include cameras, laptops, tablets, 
power tools, etc. 
 
Custom battery:  Any battery designed for the purpose of powering non-COTS applications.  It is 
designed with either COTS or custom cells. 
 
Cycle testing:  Repetitive charge discharge tests performed to demonstrate rate performance 
capability or verify continued operability after completing acceptance testing. 
 
Depth of discharge (DOD):  Ratio of the quantity of electricity (in amp-hours or watt-hours) 
removed from a cell or battery on discharge to its rated capacity. 
 
Electroformation:  Term used to describe the conversion of the material in both the positive and 
negative plates to their respective active materials.  Also called ‘formation’. 
 
End voltage:  The prescribed voltage at which the discharge (or charge, if the end-of-charge 
voltage) of a cell or battery should be terminated per the application or the manufacturer’s 
specification/recommendation. 
 
Fast charge:  A rate of charging that returns full capacity to a rechargeable battery, at a rate 
higher than the nominal rate recommended by the cell/battery manufacturer. 
 
Flooded cell:  A cell design that incorporates an excess amount of electrolyte. 
 
Forced discharge:  Discharging a cell or battery below zero volts causing voltage reversal. 
 
Formation:  Electrochemical processing of a battery plate or electrode that transforms the active 
materials into usable form. Also referred to as ‘electroformation’. 
 
Gassing:  The evolution of gas from one or more of the electrodes or the electrolyte in a cell.   
 
Internal resistance:  The opposition to the flow of electric current within a cell or battery 
expressed as the sum of the ionic and electronic resistances of the cell components. 
 
Life:  For rechargeable batteries, the duration of satisfactory performance, measured in years 
(calendar or shelf life) or in the number of charge/discharge cycles (cycle or service life).  For 
primary batteries, the duration of satisfactory performance measured in years (calendar or shelf 
life) or the period of performance under load (service life). 
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Memory effect:  A phenomenon in which a cell, operated in successive cycles to less than full 
DoD, experiences a depression of its discharge voltage and temporary loss of the rest of its 
capacity when cycled again at normal voltage levels. 
 
Module:  A grouping of interconnected cells in series and/or parallel arrangement into a single 
mechanical and electrical unit. 
 
Open circuit voltage (OCV):  The difference in potential between the terminals of a cell or the 
voltage measured when the circuit is open (no-load condition). 
 
Overcharge:  The forcing of current through a cell after all of the active material has been 
converted to the charged state.  Charging continued after 100-percent SOC is achieved. 
 
Over-discharge:  To discharge a cell or battery past the point where the full capacity has been 
obtained. 
 
Nominal voltage:  The reported or reference voltage of the cell/battery, also sometimes referred 
to as the “normal” voltage of the cell/battery. 
 
Oxygen recombination:  The process by which oxygen generated at the positive plate during 
charge is reacted at the negative plate. 
 
Prismatic cells:  A cell fabricated typically with flat plate electrodes, which are stacked to 
provide capacity. 
 
Rated capacity:  The number of ampere-hours a cell or battery can deliver under specific 
conditions (rate of discharge, end voltage, temperature), usually, the manufacturer’s rating. 
 
Shape change:  Change in shape of an electrode due to migration of active material during 
charge/discharge cycling. 
 
Shelf life:  The duration of storage under specified conditions at the end of which a cell or 
battery still retains the ability to give a specified performance. 
 
Starved electrolyte cell:  A cell containing little or no free liquid electrolyte.   
 
State of charge (SOC):  The available charge capacity in a cell or battery expressed as a 
percentage of rated capacity. 
 
Taper charge:  A charge regime delivering moderate- to high-rate charge current when the 
battery is at a low SOC and tapering the charge current to lower values as the battery reaches its 
end-of-charge voltage. 
 
Thermal runaway:  A condition whereby a cell or battery overheats and reaches very high 
temperatures in very short periods (i.e., seconds) through internal heat generation caused by an 
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internal short or due to an abusive condition.  The temperature of the cell or battery is 
uncontrollable at this point. 
 
Trickle charge:  A charge at a low rate, balancing losses through a local action and/or periodic 
discharge, to maintain a cell or battery in a fully charged condition. 
 
Unactivated shelf life:  The period of time, under specified conditions of temperature and 
environment, that an unactivated cell or battery can be stored before deteriorating below a 
specified capacity. 
 
Wet shelf life:  The period of time that a cell or battery can stand in the charged or activated 
condition before deteriorating below a specified capacity. 
 
Working voltage:  The typical voltage or range of voltage of a cell or battery during discharge. 
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4. GENERAL BATTERY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The following sections address general technical requirements intended to ensure safe outcomes 
in NASA battery deployments, addressing issues related to design, manufacture, qualification, 
and acceptance.  
 
4.1 Methodologies used in Ensuring Safe Outcomes 
 
A key aspect of ensuring safe outcomes is the approach taken to control hazards.  The following 
section addresses the prescribed strategies: failure tolerance and Design for Minimum Risk 
(DFMR).   
 
4.1.1 Failure Tolerance 
 
Failure tolerance is the basis of the NASA safety approach.  This method is applied in all safety 
evaluations unless it can be proven that a failure tolerance approach is not feasible. 
 
a. Battery systems for crewed spacecraft shall implement failure tolerance as the preferred 
approach to control all catastrophic hazard causes. 
b. The level of failure tolerance shall be the product of an integrated design and safety 
analysis but be a minimum of one. 
As an example, to be considered two-fault tolerant, a battery design should be capable of 
maintaining safe operation or incur a safe shutdown after the imposition of the failure of any two 
mutually independent catastrophic hazard control measures or features.   
For the purposes of fault tolerance discussions, NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B, 
“Human Rating Requirements and Guidelines for Space Flight Systems,” defines “catastrophic 
event” as one resulting in the death or permanent disability of a crew member or passenger or 
an event resulting in the unplanned loss/destruction of a major element of the crewed space 
system during the mission that could potentially result in the death or permanent disability of a 
crew member or passenger.   
Fault tolerance for batteries should consider the toxicity as well as the energy content.  This 
takes into consideration the causes resulting in leakage, rupture, electrical shock, fire, and 
explosion hazards.   
Note that SSP 30309 provides the requirements for the safety analysis and risk assessment for 
the ISS. 
 
4.1.2 Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) 
 
Some potentially catastrophic hazards cannot practically be controlled using failure tolerance and 
are exempted from the tolerance requirement provided the risk they pose is mitigated to the 
maximum practical extent through a defined process in which approved standards and margins 
are implemented to account for the absence of failure tolerance.  Herein, this process is called 
DFMR.   
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a. The DFMR approach shall be used to address catastrophic battery hazards that cannot 
practically be controlled by a failure tolerance approach.   
NPR 8705.2B, “Human Rating Requirements and Guidelines for Space Flight Systems,” 
recognizes that some potentially catastrophic hazards cannot be practically controlled using 
failure tolerance and are exempted from the tolerance requirement provided they are controlled 
through a defined process in which approved standards and margins are implemented to account 
for the absence of failure tolerance.  Herein, this process is called DFMR. 
DFMR is a process that relies on the application of mature/proven technology, robust design 
margins, and accepted standards for manufacturing, inspection, analysis, test, and operational 
measures to mitigate the potential for failures that cannot be controlled by failure tolerance.  
When a DFMR approach is used, technical authorities accept that the process has demonstrated 
the risk of catastrophic hazards has been minimized to the maximum practical extent. 
A risk matrix may be used to demonstrate that the applied methods have reduced the probability 
of occurrence and/or the severity of the hazards to an acceptable level for the intended use. 
This approach to hazard control takes advantage of existing acceptable processes and best 
practices.   Guidance and recommendations for acceptable processes and best practices are 
given in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 and in the appendices.  If other methods are used, rationale and 
supporting data demonstrating the adequacy of those methods should be presented.   
Examples of the kinds of battery failures that might employ DFMR include leakage and internal 
short.  Many battery or cell designs become impractical with the implementation of triple 
containment to be two-fault tolerant to catastrophic electrolyte leakage.  Similarly, the 
imposition of three layers of separators between anode and cathode to be two-fault tolerant to 
catastrophic cell internal short circuits hazards in many cases can severely degrade 
performance.  
For the purposes of streamlining the battery design approval, some simple battery designs below 
certain low energy and voltage thresholds as specified in Sections 4, 5 and 6 herein also can use 
the DFMR approach for hazard control. 
 
4.2 Key Aspects of Engineering Evaluation, Qualification, and Acceptance Testing 
 
The thorough nature of NASA’s test regime from early engineering evaluation, through 
qualification, and ultimately to acceptance testing is a key aspect in the Agency’s safe use of 
batteries in its missions.  The following section specifies general requirements in those areas and 
provides references to additional best practices. 
 
4.2.1 Engineering Evaluation 
 
This section addresses the preliminary evaluation of safety and performance features at both the 
cell and battery level and would include the evaluation testing of prospective cells before their 
selection for use in a flight battery.  Engineering evaluation commonly includes abuse test 
protocols intended to assess safety and performance features necessary for the battery design. 
a. All cell and battery designs considered for flight shall first undergo evaluation testing to 
characterize the performance and safety of the flight battery design.  
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b. Evaluation testing shall, at a minimum, consist of characterizing the cell and battery 
safety under abuse conditions of overcharge, over-discharge into reversal, external short 
circuit and cell internal short circuit, temperature tolerance, vent and burst pressure 
determination and for custom batteries (greater than 20 Wh), cell destructive physical 
analysis.  
c. Evaluation testing shall confirm manufacturer’s specifications that are relevant to the 
project, as well as confirm that the cell and/or battery design can handle unique 
requirements levied by the project.  
In the case where safety features at the cell level are rendered less effective when the cells are 
assembled into the battery, abuse testing at the cell level and then subsequently at progressive 
levels of assembly evaluates the effectiveness of these features.   
Accelerating Rate Calorimetry (ARC) testing should be performed on cells to establish a 
baseline characterization of thermal signature (calorific output as a function of temperature) for 
cells being used in custom batteries. 
Cell designs used in custom batteries should be examined by a combination of computed 
tomography and destructive physical analysis (DPA) (tear down) to assess quality of 
manufacture and absence of defects. 
When performing battery safety tests that simulate abuse conditions, the mechanical and thermal 
environment of the test article should be representative of conditions expected during normal 
use. 
JSC 66548 can be used as an example for the flight certification and acceptance of COTS 
lithium-ion batteries that details the level of testing required under the engineering, 
qualification, flight acceptance, and lot sample testing of COTS lithium-ion batteries. 
 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
 
This section addresses the qualification testing of the flight battery. 
 
a. Qualification testing shall be performed to the worst-case relevant flight environments 
with margin. 
The qualification sample of batteries should be randomly sampled from units from the 
flight lot that have passed acceptance testing.  
b. Environmental tests shall include, at a minimum, extreme temperature exposures, 
vacuum, and vibration tests. 
The margin used for qualification tests will be provided by the respective projects or programs 
or from SSP41172 for ISS environments.  Appendix C may be used as a guideline for 
qualification vibration tests (QVTs) for cells and batteries if there are no project-provided 
environments.  The margin proposed here should be consistent with the program’s margining 
policies.  In the event none are provided, as a guideline, 6 db above the maximum expected is 
typically used.  
The qualification of the battery should include testing the batteries to environmental and 
vibration levels that are higher than the mission requirements.  The number of flight missions 
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that the batteries will be used for, along with the location of the battery in the spacecraft, should 
determine the period and level of vibration.  As a minimum, the qualification test program 
should include the following:   
1. Functional baseline test (open circuit voltage (OCV), mass, capacity or load check, 
internal resistance, visual inspection). 
2. Vibration to qualification levels. 
3. Functional baseline test recheck. 
4. Charge/discharge cycles (for rechargeable batteries) or a load test (for primary 
batteries) at 20 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) margin above and below worst-case hot and 
worst-case cold, respectively.  
5. Functional baseline test recheck. 
6. Vacuum (approx. 0.1 psi) or equivalent leak checks.  
7. Functional baseline test recheck. 
For batteries used in a pressurized volume or environment, exposure to a vacuum environment 
(approximately 0.1 psi) for a minimum of 6 hours.  For batteries used in an unpressurized 
volume or environment, thermal vacuum cycles must  be performed with the deep vacuum levels 
of 1 × 10
–5
 Torr (instead of the 0.1 psi used for habitable volume/pressurized environments).  
Alternatively, the thermal cycles and vacuum environment tests can be performed independently. 
If the acceptance test vibration levels and spectra used to screen cells for manufacturing 
defects are not enveloped by the mission vibration levels, a separate qualification for acceptance 
vibration test (AVT) should be performed to verify that the screening levels do not degrade cell 
reliability. 
The qualification batteries should pass all cell and battery acceptance tests as described in 
Section 4.2.3 prior subjecting them to qualification tests. 
For custom battery designs, safety (abuse) testing performed during engineering evaluation 
should be repeated at qualification with pass/fail criteria for the qualification tests determined 
based on information derived during engineering evaluation. 
c. Flight cell lot destructive testing shall consume a randomly selected sample size that is, at 
minimum, 3 percent of the flight lot size or three cells, whichever is greater for each 
destructive test.  
This is to adequately populate the test matrix necessary to confirm critical safety and 
performance characteristics, especially those features that are critical for mission and 
crew safety.  For COTS batteries, cells can be obtained from the disassembly of a sample 
from the battery flight lot.  To achieve statistically significant results, all initial lot tests 
must be populated with a minimum of three cells.  
d. The operation of cell safety devices, if used as a control at the battery level, shall be 
verified by a qualification test at the battery level or at a level that accurately simulates 
the level at which the control is required to confirm the operation of the safety device. 
The pass/fail criteria for these qualification tests should be established after engineering 
evaluation tests are completed. 
e. Qualification testing shall be performed at the battery level, using flight equivalent 
builds. 
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Multiple qualification units may be used to run different tests in parallel.  Tests may be 
re-sequenced to accommodate schedule and resource constraints as long as the intent of 
the test is not compromised. 
JSC 66548 can be used as an example for the flight certification and acceptance of COTS 
lithium-ion batteries that details the level of testing required under the engineering, 
qualification, flight acceptance, and lot sample testing of COTS lithium-ion batteries. 
4.2.3 Acceptance Testing 
 
This section addresses the acceptance testing of the flight battery. 
 
a. All cell lots intended for custom flight batteries shall undergo 100-percent acceptance 
screening that includes, at minimum, visual inspection, mass, OCV retention, alternating 
current (AC) and/or direct current (DC) resistance, and capacity (for rechargeable 
chemistries) or load check (for primary chemistries). 
b. All of the batteries intended for flight shall undergo flight acceptance (nondestructive) 
testing, which will include an evaluation of OCV, mass, capacity (for rechargeable 
chemistries) or load check (for primaries), internal resistance, visual inspection, vibration 
to flight acceptance levels, and thermal/vacuum testing. 
As a minimum, the flight acceptance test program should include the following:   
1. Functional baseline test (OCV, mass, capacity (for rechargeable chemistries or load 
check for primaries), internal resistance, and visual inspection). 
2. Vibration to flight acceptance levels (see Appendix A for more details). 
3. Functional baseline test recheck. 
4. Vacuum (approx. 0.1 psi) or equivalent leak checks.  
5. Functional baseline test recheck. 
For batteries used in a pressurized volume or environment, exposure to a vacuum 
environment (approximately 0.1 psi) for a minimum of 6 hours. 
For batteries used in an unpressurized volume or environment, thermal vacuum cycles 
must be performed with the deep vacuum levels of 1 × 10
–5
 Torr (instead of the 0.1 psi 
used for habitable volume/pressurized environments). 
Alternatively, the thermal cycles and vacuum environment tests can be performed 
independently. 
Details of recommended flight acceptance tests are provided under each battery chemistry 
section in Section 6 with a detailed example in Section 6’s lithium-ion section.  For those 
chemistries not listed in Section 6, early consultation with program technical staff is 
recommended.  
JSC 66548 can be used as an example for the flight certification and acceptance of COTS 
lithium-ion batteries that details the level of testing required under the engineering, 
qualification, flight acceptance, and lot sample testing of COTS lithium-ion batteries. 
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4.3 Manufacturing Quality 
 
This section contains quality related provisions on the manufacturing lot and is intended to 
outline certain key aspects of manufacturing quality. 
 
4.3.1 Configuration Control 
 
Custom cell and battery designs intended for flight shall only be procured from vendors with 
configuration control processes approved by the NASA-program. 
 
Configuration control is adequate when the manufacturer maintains documentation that enables 
control and replication of all tools, fixtures, machines, instruments, settings, environmental 
conditions, contaminant mitigation measures, materials, and pass/fail criteria for the production 
of a unique cell/battery design.  This includes periodic independent verification of the certificates 
of compliance and/or analyses to meet required specifications for composition, impurities, and 
properties of materials and components.  Configuration control requires complete two-way 
traceability, which is defined as documentation that demonstrates a solid chain of custody from 
incoming materials to final assembly and vice versa.  
 
Custom cell designs should have independent material verifications by the cell manufacturer or 
customer (NASA or NASA contractor) and should not rely on a material specification sheet. 
 
4.3.2 Subsequent Flight Lot Testing 
 
Some applications could require additional lots of flight batteries/cells beyond the original lot 
that was acceptance tested, qualified, and approved for flight.  Key safety features must be 
retested to be sure that the new cell lots are performing like the previous qualified lot. 
 
a. Any new battery lot and/or cell date code shall be assumed to be a new design and 
require a repeat of all battery and/or cell lot qualification testing and mitigation measures 
specified in Section 4.2.2. 
An exception can be made for COTS cell batches delivered with two date codes that 
represent consecutive days if it can be verified they are part of a single production run. 
 
b. Subsequent flight cell lot destructive testing shall confirm that subsequent lot 
performance and safety features are the same as that of the original qualification lot. 
A key purpose of this repetition is to gain confidence that configuration control of the 
manufacturing process is still effective and that the new cell lots are performing like the previous 
qualified lot.  For example, if a cell internal fusible link is used as a control for external short 
circuit hazards, sample cells from each subsequent lot should be tested to confirm that the fusible 
link works as expected.  
Lot sample testing is carried out to confirm that the safety tolerances of the cells/batteries 
remain the same compared with the original lot.  A statistically significant number of 
cells/batteries should be randomly selected for lot sample testing and should be based on the 
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flight program, the number of cells manufactured, the period between manufacturing of the lots, 
the original materials that go into the manufacturing of a single lot, etc.  A 3- to 6-percent 
sample size has been used for past flight battery programs. 
Subsequent flight lot destructive testing can consist of a reduced set of lot sample testing but 
should include computed tomography (CT)/DPA, capacity (primary), 100-percent depth of 
discharge (DoD) cycle life (rechargeable), ARC (lithium), short circuit, and overcharge 
(rechargeable). 
ARC testing should be performed on cells and compared with baseline characterization of the 
thermal signature to evaluate consistency of subsequent lots. 
 
4.4 General Design Requirements 
 
The following design requirements are general in nature.  They are generally applicable to all 
battery builds.  
 
4.4.1 Electrical Interconnection 
 
The solid interconnection of cells to make up the battery is crucial in preventing ohmic heating, 
which would result in reduced performance and/or life and may result in a hazardous overheating 
of cells within the battery. 
 
a. The electrical interconnections that form the pack through the interconnection of cells 
shall be made of low-resistance connections such that ohmic heating at the design load 
presents no over-temperature hazard. 
b. The means of interconnection (i.e., mechanical fasteners, tack weld, etc.) and its 
verification shall ensure that the flight environments and usage profile do not reduce the 
effectiveness of the connection.  
In the case of bus bar interconnections via threaded fasteners, flight vibration as well as thermal 
variation over the course of the load profile would tend to loosen the connection.  Torqueing 
requirements coupled with fastener locking features are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of 
the connection throughout the mission (reference NASA-STD-5020, “Requirements for Threaded 
Fastening Systems in Spaceflight Hardware,” for best practices). 
 
4.4.2 Electrical Wiring 
 
The integrity of wire and the insulation used within the battery must be ensured. 
 
a. Wiring used within the flight battery shall adhere to Electrical Wire and Cable 
Acceptance Tests described in JSC-STD-8080.5 E-24 or be certified via an equivalent 
standard.  
 
4.4.3 Lithium-ion Battery and Cell Monitoring 
 
For lithium-ion batteries, monitoring of key parameters such as cell/battery voltages, cell 
temperature, and battery/string current is necessary to ascertain health and maintain safe 
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operation of the battery.  Monitoring of pertinent parameters may show adverse trends in the 
state of health and can be essential to investigating failures within the battery. 
 
a. For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure modes due to cell under/over 
voltage, monitoring shall be provided in order to detect and control hazardous under/over 
voltage of any cell in the battery. 
The requirements here seek to strike a balance between monitoring required for safety 
and the reliability of the battery and accompanying instrumentation.   
b. For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure modes due to high currents, 
battery-level current monitoring shall be provided in order to detect and control 
hazardous currents in the battery. 
c. For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure modes due to high/low 
temperatures, temperature monitoring shall be provided to detect and control hazardous 
temperatures at any cell in the battery.  
Optimal number and placement of the temperature sensors to provide adequate coverage 
for all cells should be based on high-fidelity thermal analysis for nominal and off-
nominal conditions. 
d. For custom battery designs with catastrophic failure modes, instrumentation shall collect 
data during use and during charge and be reviewable on the ground for use in trending 
and/or post anomaly analysis. 
The requirements above focus on key measurements and time periods for monitoring.  For 
example, a requirement to monitor key parameters even when not in use (i.e., on the shelf) may 
be prohibitive (i.e., may drive a monitoring system that is self-powered and self-contained within 
the battery) and yield other adverse effects.   
 
4.4.4 Cell Matching 
 
Cell performance matching for selection into batteries is a useful practice in custom battery 
builds when done in addition to cell acceptance screening specified in Section 4.2.3b. 
 
a. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, cell performance matching prior to 
battery assembly shall be performed to mitigate state-of-charge (SOC) imbalances that 
could adversely affect battery performance and/or safety. 
b. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, cells shall be matched in a battery 
based on charge retention, internal resistance and/or AC impedance, and ampere-hour 
capacity (for rechargeable chemistries). 
The requirements above prescribe a matching protocol intended to select from the 
acceptance screened lot of cells.  These requirements are not a remedy for poor lot 
uniformity.  Note that cell matching and the use of balancing circuits should not be rationale 
for accepting lots with poor cell lot uniformity, which indicates a less controlled 
manufacturing process and may indicate product with a higher likelihood of rapid 
degradation of field performance.  
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4.4.5 Dissimilar Controls  
 
For battery chemistries with catastrophic failure modes due to excessive charge or discharge 
(including external short circuit), software-based controls to mitigate these hazards are more and 
more common.  These controllers manage the charging and discharging of the battery within safe 
parameters and can be located in the battery charger, the power distribution system, and/or the 
battery itself. 
  
a. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, software-based controls responsible 
for managing the charge/discharge of the battery shall operate inside a safe envelope 
maintained by active or passive hardware-based controls and guards. 
b. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, in cases where software-based 
controls are not enveloped by hardware controls, the software is safety critical and its 
development shall include conventional software assurance processes and confidence not 
based solely on integrated testing.  
 
4.5 Mission Usage 
 
a. During the preparation phase for on-orbit processing, the hardware owner shall provide 
details for safe operation of the hardware on-orbit, any on-orbit processing that may be 
required, and safe stowage or disposal. 
b. The hardware owner shall establish on-orbit processes and operational constraints in 
coordination with the mission controllers for the hardware.   
Provide on-orbit processes that may include procedures for hardware inspection and 
checkout that are required prior to on-orbit usage of the equipment. 
Provide procedures to dispose of depleted cell(s) and batteries and replace them if the 
battery-powered applications are designed for on-orbit replacement. 
Provide procedures for recharging, re-installing, and storing rechargeable cells and 
batteries if the application is designed for rechargeable cells or batteries. 
Provide procedures to remove, visually inspect, tape, and bag depleted or discrepant 
cells and battery packs and place them in dry trash.  
NOTE: For cells and batteries that are returned as trash on Russian vehicles, the 
requirements given in P32928-103, "Requirement for International Partner Cargoes 
Transported on Russian Progress and Soyuz Vehicles," are followed. 
Crew members should record anomalies during any phase of battery use from 
installation and usage through removal/recharge to storage/disposal. 
c. For the custom lithium-ion battery designs that are greater than 12 volts (V) and  
60 Wh and required to be used in a crewed environment for more than 1 year or for 
multiple missions requiring launch and landing, the health of the battery shall be 
monitored to allow insight into changes that could lead to a catastrophic failure.  
The long-term physical and chemical changes associated with the cells and internal 
construction of the batteries are not typically fully understood when a custom-designed 
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battery is flown for space application; hence, it is imperative to monitor the health of the 
battery.  Techniques such as thermography when the battery is under load can provide 
information on bad welds or electrical connections; unique discharge loads with a high 
current pulse inserted to provide internal resistance measurements can also provide a 
warning to changes that may lead to a catastrophic failure.  
A fleet leader may be provided on ground to monitor and characterize the health and 
physical appearance of the battery.  The fleet leader should have storage and operating 
time and cycles, with margin, in excess of the flight units to provide confidence that any 
anomalous behavior may be detected prior to occurring in flight. 
 
4.6 Post-flight Cell and Pack Evaluation 
 
a. A post-flight performance evaluation of the hardware and the batteries shall be conducted 
when hardware is returned post-flight.   
b. For cells and batteries installed in hardware during return flight, after the post-flight 
evaluation, the cells and battery pack shall be removed so that the equipment may be 
stored without the cells and pack installed.  
An exception is made for coin cells that provide memory storage for hardware.  Cells 
providing memory storage need not be removed unless performance degradation has 
been noted, the shelf life has expired, or signs of damage or corrosion are evident.   
For additional information, battery storage is defined in JSC 63322, “Packaging Requirements 
for Launch, On-Orbit Storage and Disposal of Batteries,” and JSC 26549, “JSC Manual for 
Control of Program Stock.”  Details regarding the process for post-flight removal of cells or 
battery packs are provided in JWI 8705.3. 
 
4.7 Ground Processing Requirements 
 
Battery systems intended for crewed spacecraft must maintain safety during ground handling, 
transportation, and ground operations.  While this document contains a number of items that 
should be considered to ensure safety of ground battery operations and handling, the subset listed 
in this section is considered necessary and contains requirements to ensure safe operation. 
 
a. The hardware developer or provider shall establish protocols and controls to address 
identified hazards and document those processes in the safety data package prepared for 
the system.  
 
4.7.1 Requirements for Ground Handling and Transportation 
 
a. Sufficient ventilation shall be provided when processing non-sealed batteries to ensure 
that the concentrations of electrolyte vapors, combustible gases, or toxic gases do not 
reach 50 percent of the lower exposure limit (LEL).   
b. Ground handling and transportation shall be in accordance with JPR 1700.1, “JSC Safety 
and Health Handbook,” or equivalent standards. 
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Ground handling and transportation best practices include:  
a. Battery test benches and tables should be coated with electrolyte-impervious coatings.  
b. The battery test areas should have a designated eye wash station and shower.  
c. Primary lithium and lithium-ion battery transportation on-site and off-site should meet 
Department of Transportation (DoT) requirements per 49 CFR 173.185.  
d. Lithium primary and lithium-ion rechargeable batteries that are to be transported over 
publicly accessed roads with lithium equivalent content exceeding 8.0 grams per battery 
should have warning labels in accordance with DoT requirements per 49 CFR 173.185.  
e. Shock sensors should be installed on containers transporting cells and batteries 
(typically classified as Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Class 9 by 49 CFR).  
f. Temperature sensors should be installed on containers transporting cells and batteries 
(typically classified as HAZMAT Class 9 by 49 CFR). 
g. The charge level for secondary lithium and lithium-ion cells and batteries transported on 
publicly accessed roadways should not exceed 50 percent of rated charge capacity. 
 
JWI 8705.3, “Battery Processing.” contains excellent guidance regarding ground handling. 
 
4.7.2 Design and Operations Requirements for Ground Support Equipment 
 
Ground support equipment (GSE) consists of the non-flight systems, equipment, or devices (with 
a physical or functional interface with flight hardware) necessary to routinely support the 
operations of transporting, receiving, handling, assembly, inspection, test, checkout, and 
servicing of flight hardware. 
 
a. GSE for batteries shall be designed such that the combination of the battery and GSE 
does not reduce the level of failure tolerance intended in the flight battery design.  
Equipment used to test or charge batteries should have redundant controls in place, 
including dissimilar redundancy to prevent hazards due to malfunction of test equipment. 
Best practices in GSE design include but are not limited to:  
a. The polarity of GSE connecting to battery terminals should be keyed.  
b. For external chargers, the specification document for the charger should be used as 
guidance for the build and test procedures. 
c. COTS GSE should not be modified without GSE manufacturer’s recommendations and 
approval.  
d. All test equipment, especially those interfacing with flight batteries, should be calibrated 
periodically as required by the equipment manufacturer.  Verification of calibration 
should be confirmed before the start of test so that no calibration will be required during 
the test program.  
e. Test protocols programmed into the GSE should have tolerance ranges for all the 
parameters used for charging or operation. 
f. Test protocols programmed into the GSE should have design limits specified for the test 
parameters.  
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g. Test protocols programmed into the GSE should have safety limits specified for the test 
program.  
h. The test equipment should be designed with limits that prevent restart of equipment or 
continuation of the test in the event of power, test equipment, or battery failures. 
i. Safety devices and mandatory verification steps should be incorporated into the GSE 
designs and handling/operating procedures, especially where failure tolerance is not met 
by the battery system alone. 
j. GSE should be verified to operate safely prior to connecting a battery to it.  
k. Uninterrupted power supply should be provided for all GSE that involves critical testing, 
such as testing of flight batteries.  
l. Battery test equipment should be internally protected against short circuits.  
m. Battery test equipment should not impose short circuits on the test article.  
n. Access to emergency eye wash, shower, or combination units for the battery charging 
and conditioning area should not be obstructed and should be no more than 25 feet 
distant or 10 seconds travel time from the battery test area.  
o. Personnel involved with handling, testing, installing, or any other battery-related 
operations should be trained as required in the specific battery chemistry safety.  Test 
team personnel should receive daily briefings on the tasks to be carried out each day with 
an emphasis on safety.  
p. All battery storage should be in accordance with the manufacturer’s specification and 
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). 
q. A Lith-X or Class ABC fire extinguisher, as required per the MSDS of the batteries, 
should be available in the test location. 
 
4.8 Shelf and Service Life Related Requirements 
 
a. Shelf and service life of batteries shall be tracked.  
Appendix C provides further details on the shelf life and service life of various commonly 
used cell chemistries. 
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5. GENERAL BATTERY HAZARDS AND CONTROLS 
 
Potential hazards and safe design requirements are discussed in this section.  Hazard sources are 
identified, hazard manifestations are explained, and hazard prevention and control requirements 
are presented.  Not all controls will apply to all battery designs; hence, thorough identification of 
hazards and controls is required to prove design safety. 
 
At minimum, fire/explosion, chemical exposure, electrical shock, and touch temperature are 
battery hazards to crewed spacecraft and crew.  
 
Requirements: 
 
a. The possible sources of battery hazards shall be identified for each battery design while 
considering the entire set of mission phases and conditions. 
b. Each hazard shall be evaluated to determine applicability and to identify all sources, 
which can be broadly categorized as inadequate design, poor workmanship, and/or abuse 
(electrical, mechanical, and/or thermal).   
See Section 6 for details of chemistry-specific battery hazard sources. 
c. The hazard severity shall be categorized as catastrophic, critical, or non-critical.  
 
5.1 Fire/Explosion Hazard 
 
Fire and/or explosion hazards can result from the generation and ignition of a combustible gas 
mixture, evolution of large quantities of free gases, or initiation of a runaway internal reaction in 
a cell (thermal runaway).  Excessive internal pressure (either within cell or battery enclosure) can 
result in failure of cell and/or battery seals and cases.  Cell and/or battery contents can then be 
expelled from the cell, either slowly or forcibly.  Shrapnel fragments from violent cell or battery 
enclosure bursting can cause damage upon impact to personnel, structure, or equipment. 
 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical Reaction 
 
1. Some batteries generate hydrogen and/or oxygen while discharging and/or charging.  
Hydrogen gas, mixed with air or oxygen, is flammable and/or explosive over a 
concentration range of 4 percent to 75 percent by volume in air.   
2. Many aqueous electrolyte cells subjected to charging will generate oxygen as the charge 
nears completion, providing oxygen where none may have existed previously, such as in 
a battery container that had been purged with nitrogen to flush away oxygen.   
3. Accumulation of gases in a sealed cell or battery case can build up pressure within the 
case. 
4. A plugged or faulty pressure relief valve in a cell or battery enclosure. 
5. Electrolysis of aqueous electrolyte on ground paths into hydrogen and oxygen, creating 
an explosive gas mixture. 
6. Vaporization and decomposition of flammable electrolytes to form flammable gases or 
aerosols. 
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5.1.1.1 Requirements – Chemical Reaction 
 
Flammability 
 
a. Design of the hardware shall limit accumulation of hydrogen in enclosed spaces 
containing oxygen to less than 2 percent of the total free-space volume.  
The traditional means of avoiding hydrogen accumulation is to provide continuous air 
ventilation at a rate sufficient to dilute evolved hydrogen below 2.0 percent, which gives 
100-percent margin below the 4-percent flammability level.  Wherever a flammable 
and/or explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen may exist, an ignition source is 
presumed to exist because the energy required for ignition of stoichiometric hydrogen 
and oxygen mixtures is only on the order of 1 to 2 microjoules.   
b. Electrolyte absorbing materials used in battery designs shall be nonflammable or flame 
retardant.  
Electrically conductive battery parts should be insulated to protect against a 
flammability hazard if the absorbent material could trap flammable electrolyte against 
those conductive battery parts. 
The volume of void spaces inside the battery case that cannot be eliminated by design 
should be filled with electrolyte-resistant nonflammable filler, such as potting material or 
electrolyte absorbent material.  Fillers limit the volume and mass of gases that can 
accumulate prior to venting, thus limiting the force of any gas explosion.  
 
Venting of Battery Enclosure 
 
c. The battery enclosure and cells shall prevent excessive pressure buildup due to gas 
accumulation.  
A venting feature is a designed opening or an intended weak point that will release below 
an intended pressure.  A relief valve is a mechanism designed to open at a specified 
pressure and may or may not reseal after the pressure is released. 
Depending on the cell chemistry and cell case, the venting feature may need a liquid 
impermeable, gas permeable covering to trap electrolyte while venting gases.   
Cell vents or relief valves should not be blocked or plugged with the application of 
potting materials that would prevent them from venting safely. 
d. Relief valves and vents used as controls for the accumulation of excessive pressure shall 
be tested. 
Cell vents should be tested in a flight-like mechanical configuration to verify that they 
operate correctly at the designed pressure. 
Relief valves on battery enclosures should be tested after installation to verify that they 
operate correctly at the designed pressure. 
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Burst of Pressurized Battery Chemistries 
 
e. If the battery cell enclosure failure mode is demonstrated to be leak-before-burst, then the 
ratio of failure pressure to vent pressure shall be a minimum of 1.5:1. 
A test of relief-valve-equipped cells and battery cases should disable the relief function 
and then apply an internal pressure equal to 1.5 times the relief valve maximum vent 
pressure.  There should be no detectable leak.    
Leak-before-burst: A design concept in which potentially critical flaws will grow through 
the wall of the pressurized hardware and cause pressure-relieving leakage rather than 
burst (catastrophic failure) at maximum design pressure. 
f. All other cell enclosures shall demonstrate a minimum ratio of failure pressure to vent 
pressure of 2.5:1. 
g. Cells that do not meet the 1.5:1 ratio shall not be used for manned space applications. 
Batteries with pressurized metallic cells that exceed an internal pressure of 100 psi are 
classified as special pressurized equipment and must meet the leak-before-burst failure 
mode, demonstrate a minimum factor of safety for the design burst to maximum design 
pressure of 1.5:1 and follow acceptance and qualification test requirements as called out 
in ANSI/AIAA S-080-1998, “Space Systems – Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized 
Structures, and Pressure Components.” 
For fracture control, batteries are unique forms of pressurized containers. Batteries and 
battery systems can be classified as non-fracture-critical by meeting one of the following: 
1. Non-hazardous leak-before-burst design. 
2. The pressure of the sealed container is less than 689.5 KPa (100 psia); the sealed 
container does not contain a hazardous fluid; and loss of pressure in the system 
will not result in a catastrophic hazard. 
3. Small batteries that fall under the noncritical category are exempt from fracture 
control. 
Otherwise, the requirements of NASA-STD-5019, “Fracture Control Requirements for 
Spaceflight Hardware,” must be addressed. 
 
5.1.2 Sources – Overcharge Failure/Over-discharge Failure 
 
1. Failure of charge control devices such as smart chips, feedback loops, switches, 
temperature sensors, and timing devices. 
2. Inadvertent charging of primary/nonrechargeable batteries. 
3. Improper design of a device containing both a battery and an additional power source that 
also contains a battery (primary or secondary) which unintentionally creates a current 
path that can lead to inadvertent transfer of charge between the two sources.  
4. Improper charging device or method. 
5. Increase in cell imbalance caused when batteries with unbalanced cells in series are 
charged and discharged, which leads to further variations in cell voltages and/or 
capacities with service life.  This can lead to inadvertent over-discharge of one or more 
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cells in a string, potentially causing the weak cells to go into a voltage reversal (over-
discharge) condition.  
6. Circulating currents between parallel-connected cell stacks resulting from lowered 
voltage in one or more stacks due to cell or insulating material degradation, followed by 
current flow from adjacent electrically sound stacks as a result of the difference between 
stack potentials.  
 
5.1.2.1 Requirements - Overcharge Failure/Over-discharge Failure 
 
a. The battery/charger design shall maintain required failure tolerance against overcharge/ 
over-discharge failure. 
b. Operational procedures shall ensure that the battery is not operated outside limits 
recommended by the cell/battery pack manufacturer or that established during 
qualification testing.  
c. The charger shall be designed for the specific type of battery being used and incorporate 
the necessary charge termination controls.  
Charge termination criteria usually vary with battery chemistry. 
d. Inadvertent charging of primary batteries shall be prevented. 
For batteries with cells or cell strings that should not be charged (as in primary/ 
nonrechargeable batteries), redundant serial blocking diodes should be installed in each 
parallel leg of a battery consisting of primary cells to prevent circulating currents 
between parallel cells or cell stacks, unless tests show these currents cannot present 
catastrophic failure modes.  Small Schottky diodes have been used for this purpose to 
minimize voltage drop.  
e. Uncontrolled charging of secondary batteries shall be prevented. 
f. Charger circuit schematic shall be reviewed and evaluated for required failure tolerance.   
g. For external chargers, the specification document for the charger shall be used as 
guidance for the development of in-flight charging procedures.  
h. If it can lead to a hazardous condition, the charger shall be designed to stop charging the 
battery after a set period of time to prevent continuous balancing charge discharge loops. 
i. Operational tolerances of the charger shall not exceed the safe operating range of the cell 
or battery.  
j. Operational protocols programmed into battery chargers used on spacecraft shall have 
safety limits specified. 
 
5.1.3 Sources – External Short Circuit 
 
1. External to battery short circuit sources:  
a. Bridging at the power or sense voltage connectors 
b. Bridging with the power (charging), load, or voltage sense cables 
c. Bridging at the battery load, charging source, or voltage monitor 
2. Internal to battery but external to cell short circuit sources: 
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a. Faulty bussing/cell interconnect insulation 
b. Faulty wiring insulation 
c. Conductive electrolyte leakage path 
d. Conductive condensation or water intrusion path 
e. Faulty cell-to-cell electrical isolation 
f. Faulty cell-to-structure electrical isolation 
g. Conductive contaminant bridge 
3. Circulating currents due to corona arcing between poorly insulated conductive surfaces in 
high-voltage batteries while exposed to low pressures. 
 
5.1.3.1 Requirements – External Short Circuit 
 
a. External shorts to the battery shall be controlled using a combination of preventive 
controls.    
External shorts are normally prevented using insulative barriers and current limiters. 
Insulative barriers include well-insulated connectors with adequate separation between 
positive and negative battery pins, adequate cable insulation, insulation between internal 
cell terminals and the battery case, insulation between banks of series cells, etc.  
Circuit interrupters that are rated well below the battery's peak current source capability 
should be installed in the battery power circuit.  Interrupters may be fuses, circuit 
breakers, thermal switches, PTCs, or other effective devices.  Circuit interrupters (as one 
of several design constraints on limiter sizing) such as fuses should be rated at  
200 percent of the maximum load to be provided by the battery in order to avoid nuisance 
trips.  Circuit interrupters other than fuses should be rated at a value that is equal to or 
lower than the maximum current that the cell is capable of handling without causing 
venting, smoke, explosion, fire, or thermal runaway.   
Since the battery case is usually grounded/bonded to the structure, the interrupters 
should be in the ground (negative) leg of a battery where the negative terminal is 
connected to ground.  Where the circuit is “floating,” as in plastic battery cases used in 
those for portable electronic devices, the circuit interrupters can be placed in either 
leg.  In either case, the circuit interrupters should be placed as close to the cell or battery 
terminals as the design will allow to maximize the zone of protection.  
The cell and battery maximum continuous and pulse current-carrying capability dictated 
by worst-case operating conditions should be confirmed by testing to verify that the 
battery remains safe under those conditions and that the current limiter(s) have been 
properly selected to clear short circuits while avoiding nuisance trips.  
b. Controls for battery external shorts shall be tested at the appropriate and relevant battery 
configuration in the relevant environment.  
The appropriate configuration and environment is critical during the test, as factors such 
as thermal gradients, heat dissipation paths, heat transfer, as well as the current-
carrying capability of the interconnects and cells vary with battery design as well as with 
environment (e.g., temperatures, pressurized versus unpressurized environments, etc.). 
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The smart external short (external to the battery) circuit test uses an impedance in the 
external circuit that is set just below the limits of the current limiters in the battery pack 
design, such that the battery tolerances are tested under maximum stress conditions.  
c. The battery packs shall be tested for shorts (bypassing all battery level current limiters) of 
the low and high impedance types and provide protection controls accordingly.   
Cell level safety controls may not work effectively, as safety controls at the battery level 
or may become a hazard cause themselves.  Hence, testing in the relevant configuration 
and environment is critical to understanding the worst-case hazards.  For example, cell-
level controls such as positive thermal coefficient (PTC) current limiting devices should 
be characterized by test and should be shown to be effective at the cell and appropriate 
string or bank level before the flight design is completed as a part of the engineering 
evaluation described in section 4.2.1.  The appropriate configuration and environment is 
critical during the test, as factors such as thermal gradients, heat dissipation paths, heat 
transfer, as well as the current-carrying capability of the interconnects and cells vary 
with battery design as well as with environment (e.g., temperatures, pressurized versus 
unpressurized environments, etc.). 
Low impedance shorts, also known as hard shorts, are short circuits of the lowest 
possible impedance in the external circuit that can be applied during test.  Cables, 
connectors, and instrumentation are all designed to minimize impedance applied to the 
battery pack under test.  
A high impedance short (smart shorts external to cell but internal to battery) occurs 
inside the battery that has been determined to be a worst-case condition (determined by 
analysis and engineering evaluation test) for the battery pack as the cell response falls 
outside the purview of the protective devices.   
Cell level controls such as PTC current limiting devices should be characterized before 
the flight design is completed.  PTC device limitations should be characterized using tests 
and should be shown to be effective by testing at the cell and appropriate string or bank 
level. 
Absorbent material should be provided to absorb any condensation that may occur due to 
widely varying temperature changes.  Such condensation on conductive surfaces within 
the battery could lead to a short circuit. 
d. The surfaces of battery terminals on the outside of the battery case shall be protected 
from accidental bridging. 
This may be accomplished by using a scoop-proof female connector, recessing stud-type 
terminals, installation of effective insulating barriers, etc. 
e. All inner surfaces of metal battery enclosures shall be anodized and/or coated with a non-
electrically conductive electrolyte-resistant paint to prevent a subsequent short circuit 
hazard. 
f. Battery and cell terminals shall be protected from contact with other conductive surfaces.   
Examples include potting the terminals with room-temperature vulcanizing (RTV) 
silicone or other nonconductive sealants or by isolating the terminals with a 
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nonconductive barrier.  Leaked electrolyte is also a conductor that can be a cause of a 
short. 
g. Battery terminals that pass through metal battery enclosures shall be insulated from the 
case by an insulating collar or other effective means. 
h. Wires inside the battery case shall be insulated, restrained from contact with cell 
terminals, protected against chafing, and physically constrained from movement due to 
vibration or shock.   
This should be verified by inspection of each final battery assembly before it is 
completely sealed.  The qualification unit should be inspected after vibration and shock 
testing. 
Standards for electronic circuit board workmanship, wire crimping, interconnect cables, 
harnessing, wiring, soldering of electrical and electronic assemblies, electrostatic 
discharge control for protection of electronic components and assemblies, and 
qualification and performance specification for rigid printed boards should be followed 
per the documents listed in Section 2.1.  
Controls should be verified by carrying out the insulation/isolation resistance test.   
The isolation resistance divided by the maximum working voltage of the circuit under test 
should be at least 100 ohm/V (UL 840 or IECEC60068-2-30). 
i. Adjacent insulative barriers such as layers, wraps, and coatings shall be unlike in design 
and material properties. 
Unlike examples are nonflammable paper, plastic shrink wrap, durable tape, fiberglass, 
penetration resistant layers, etc.  Select only electrolyte resistant or compatible materials 
that can withstand worst-case mission temperature extremes inside the battery. 
j. In battery designs greater than 50 Vdc, corona-induced short circuits (high-voltage-
induced gas breakdown) shall be prevented. 
Corona can be mitigated by proper design and material selection (reference MSFC-STD-
531).  If higher voltages and low operating pressures are anticipated or if a single failure 
(leak) can lead to low operating pressures, testing should be performed to verify corona 
design mitigations.   
 
5.1.4 Sources – Internal Short Circuit Failure 
 
Catastrophic internal shorts are generally rare events but can be very violent and 
damaging.  Demonstrating tolerance to all external shorts does not imply achieving 
tolerance to all internal shorts.  There are no tests that fully screen for the possibility or 
the severity of outcome for an internal short circuit of an individual cell.   
 
Although thermal runaway has been attributed in some cases to internal shorts, it is 
difficult to prove that this was the cause due to the loss of evidence after such an event.  
Although difficult to prove after an event, this phenomenon has been well studied with 
simulated internal shorts in a research environment using different methods.   
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Internal shorts can occur in two ways:  
1. Poor quality control of the cell manufacturing process that allow impurities and 
contaminants to be present as latent defects inside the cell, which can later pierce 
the separator causing an internal short circuit that can result in electrolyte leakage, 
fire, and thermal runaway.  
2. Cells used beyond their specifications, such as charge and discharge rates beyond 
the manufacturer's recommended limits; exceeding maximum charge current, end-
of-charge, or end-of-discharge voltages; or exceeding operational temperature 
environments. 
In lithium ion rechargeable batteries, these deviations can cause the deposition of 
dendritic deposits of lithium during charge and  of copper after a dissolution and 
deposition during over-discharge which may cause separator damage.  If these 
dendrites create an internal short circuit, localized temperature rise due to 
localized high current flow through the internal short circuit can lead to eventual 
thermal runaway and fire due to the flammability of the electrolyte.   
All cell chemistries and cell designs are susceptible to internal shorts.  However, not all 
internal shorts result in a thermal runaway.  If thermal runaway occurs during cell abuse 
testing (see Section 4.2.1.b), then the cells are referred to as intolerant of internal shorts.  
In general, most lithium-based cell chemistries are prone to catastrophic internal shorts, 
while those with aqueous electrolytes are not.     
 
Sources of internal cell short: 
 
1. Induced via charge/discharge and temperature abuse, which can cause the 
deposition of metallic dendrites of copper and/or lithium upon cycling, leading to 
separator stress to the point of failure. 
2. Separator defects or damage during manufacture or assembly. 
3. Electrode defects (e.g., metallic burrs) and/or degradation . 
4. Tab/lead defects or inadequate isolation. 
5. Misalignment of electrodes and separators during winding/stacking. 
6. Impurities or contaminants. 
7. Soft goods seal or glass-to-metal seal failure that compromises its electrical 
isolation function. 
 
5.1.4.1 Requirements – Internal Short Circuit 
 
a. Cells used in COTS batteries or cells selected for a custom battery shall be evaluated to 
ascertain the severity of an internal short circuit event. 
Evaluation criteria of the short circuit event can include, but are not limited to, maximum 
cell temperature achieved, time to maximum temperature and duration of event, products 
vented/ejected from the cell, measurement and/or video of flames/hot gases exiting the 
cell, etc. 
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Internal short circuits can be initiated and triggered within a cell by various thermal and 
mechanical methods.  The mechanical methods involve crushing, penetrating, and/or 
shocking forces applied to the cell.  Thermal methods involve heat exposure to damage 
the separator that insulates the anode and cathode.  More advanced methods involve 
implanting defects into a cell either during manufacture or afterwards and triggering the 
short by mechanical or thermal means.  
b. Measures shall be taken to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of an internal short 
circuit event to a level acceptable to the program/project. 
Best practices listed below are intended to minimize the likelihood of a cell internal short event 
occurring.  Section 5.1.5 discusses steps to be taken when trying to minimize the 
consequence/severity of an internal short circuit event in a custom battery design.   
 
1. Design mitigation measures 
a. In the case of a custom battery design, only cell designs whose performance 
and safety have been sufficiently characterized to support safety assessment 
and validation of the abuse tolerance and where insight into the 
manufacturing control process is provided should be approved.   
b. In the case of COTS battery designs, only batteries whose performance and 
safety have been sufficiently characterized to support safety assessment and 
validation of the abuse tolerance should be approved. 
c. Batteries should be designed to perform well within the manufacturer’s 
specifications for the cells used to build the battery.   
d. If a particular cell/battery is to be used in an application or environment that 
is beyond the manufacturer’s specification, extensive testing with margin to 
predicted environments should be carried out to confirm that the battery 
design will not be driven into a catastrophic safety hazard.   
e. Battery designs should also have the required fault tolerance in place to 
prevent the cells from being subjected to off-nominal conditions that result in 
the formation of internal shorts.   
f. Cells or batteries used in space applications should not have any records of 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) recalls. 
2. Manufacturing mitigation measures 
a. For custom battery designs, cells should be selected from cell manufacturers 
with a mature production history.   
b. Cell lots should be defined for each battery system as all cells with a common 
date code made from the same continuous production run.   
c. In the case of a custom cell or custom battery design, a cell production line 
audit of the cell design should be conducted to evaluate how well 
contamination, humidity control, and cell defects are limited in all phases of 
cell production processes. High particle counts and poor contamination and 
humidity control are known to contribute to the high occurrence of cell 
failures.  
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3. Test mitigation measures 
a. For custom battery designs, rigorous 100-percent cell acceptance testing 
should be carried out, including charge retention (soft shorts), performance 
uniformity. Poor OCV stability, poor coulombic efficiency (discharge ampere-
hour (Ah) out/charge Ah in), internal resistance fluctuations, and high self-
discharge (poor voltage retention) are indicators of internal cell defects that 
could result in an internal short circuit.  As an additional measure, the cells 
can be X-rayed for jelly roll or stack misalignment and other defects that 
could cause internal shorts. Credit can be taken for X-rays carried out at the 
manufacturing facility. 
b. For custom-designed and COTS  batteries, early in the cell design selection 
process random sample cells should be examined by DPA and nondestructive 
evaluation (NDE) techniques (CT scans or high-resolution X-rays) to look for 
defects that could develop into latent internal short circuits.  Since production 
quality is known to vary from lot to lot, this DPA and NDE sample testing 
should be required for all flight lots.  
c. All anomalous observations in a DPA should be chemically analyzed and 
discussed with the cell manufacturer to determine whether they will lead to a 
catastrophic latent defect through the life of the cell. 
d. For lithium-ion and primary lithium systems, the vibration test levels shall be 
significantly higher than those typically imposed for acceptance tests intended 
to detect workmanship defects (Appendix C).  As a consequence, qualification 
acceptance vibration testing, which is done at levels at least two times than 
that used for acceptance, may be necessary to demonstrate that the higher 
acceptance levels will not adversely impact performance (see Appendix C). 
4. Operation 
a. The battery system should be operated in a way that preserves measurably 
positive margins in operating voltage, current, temperature, and cycle life 
versus the manufacturer’s limits for the cell design.   
b. If the cell/battery is to be used in environments or applications that are 
beyond the manufacturer’s specification, relevant testing should be carried 
out to qualify the battery design to confirm that no failures will develop due to 
this type of usage during the life of the battery.  In addition, samples from 
each new lot should be tested to confirm that this tolerance and safe 
performance capability exists on subsequent productions. 
 
Information on mitigating measures for the lithium-based chemistries is provided in the relevant 
sections in Section 6. 
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5.1.5 Sources – Thermal Runaway Propagation 
 
1. Thermal runaway can be induced by: 
 Overcharge (see Section 5.1.2) 
 Short circuit (see Section 5.1.3) 
 Internal cell short circuit (see Section 5.1.4) 
 Excessively high temperature (see Section 5.4) 
 
5.1.5.1 Requirements – Thermal Runaway Propagation 
 
a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy cells 
(greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with catastrophic 
failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity of a worst-case 
single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design to demonstrate cell-to-
cell propagation in the intended application and environment. 
Worst-case thermal runaway events will include method and location of thermal runaway 
initiation and environmental conditions. Thermal analysis that considers ohmic and 
entropic heating should be performed and validated by test. 
NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its battery 
deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols.  This prevention-centered 
approach has included extensive screening for manufacturing defects, as well as robust 
battery management controls that prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of 
multiple system failures.  This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of 
such an event highly improbable.  
This requirement focuses not on the likelihood of such an event but rather on 
understanding the severity of consequences in the intended application should this 
unlikely event occur.   Understanding the consequences of an event allows an informed 
risk assessment and identifies potential mitigation via design or operations.  
b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the severity 
(consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment as well as to 
identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could appreciably reduce 
that severity. 
In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with 
catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the severity of a 
possible thermal runaway event.  Programs should assess whether there are reasonable 
design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of the outcome. 
Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., 
temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled contaminates, 
and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard. 
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5.2 Chemical Exposure Hazards 
 
Battery cells may contain and/or generate toxic and/or corrosive gases.  Release of these 
chemicals and gases into the enclosed environment of a space vehicle would contaminate the air 
supply and exposed surfaces, creating health hazards for personnel, operational problems for 
surrounding hardware, and potential structural problems for surrounding facilities.  Release of 
these chemicals and gases external to a space vehicle also may contaminate a space suit and 
create a resulting human exposure hazard upon return to a habitable volume.  
 
Electrolyte leakage occurs during the unintended venting of electrolyte liquid and gases.   
 
a. An assessment shall be made by a toxicologist on the level of toxicity associated with the 
vented products of the battery.   
If the cell electrolyte is rated at toxicology level 2 or higher, the leakage hazard is 
considered catastrophic because at minimum exposure to eye tissue, it can cause 
permanent blindness.  Potassium hydroxide (KOH) and common lithium-ion electrolytes 
are typically toxicity level 2 risks. 
 
5.2.1 Chemical Exposure Sources – Mechanical Failure 
 
1. Rupture or structural failure of cell case during launch or use, permitting uncontrolled 
release of electrolyte and gases into the battery enclosure or beyond.  
2. Breakage or other failure of sealing provisions, permitting uncontrolled release of 
electrolyte and gases to the battery environment. 
3. Breakage of mounting provisions, including bolts, permitting unconstrained movement of 
the battery. 
4. Fracture of internal current-carrying components, providing a source for arcing and 
explosion. 
5. Generation and release of toxic and/or corrosive gases and liquids via venting. 
 
5.2.1.1 Requirements - Mechanical Failure 
 
a. Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe after exposure to required vibration 
environments (e.g., SSP 41172, SSP 52005). 
b. Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe after exposure to required shock 
environments.  
c. Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe after exposure to required 
atmospheric/vacuum environments. 
d. Cell and battery enclosure materials shall be compatible and ensure that the material 
strength and function are maintained after exposure to electrolyte liquids and 
gases/vapors, painted coatings, potting materials and their solvents, cleaning solutions, 
and cell case sealing materials and their solvents. 
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5.2.2 Sources – Seals and Vents 
 
1. Faulty seals in cells. 
2. Inadequate design of mechanism to trap electrolyte within the cell, such as a vent tube 
extension or Teflon frit in the vent tube, as pertains to cell designs with a relief valve. 
3. Forced electrolyte leakage due to cell overheating under electrical, mechanical, and/or 
thermal abuse conditions. 
4. Exposure to high temperatures may damage or degrade the internal components of the 
battery, the battery container, or other equipment in close proximity to the battery. 
 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals and Vents 
 
a. A welded seal construction without softgood seals shall be used for all Li-SO2 and 
oxyhalide battery chemistries and be provided with a rupture disk or equivalent pressure-
relief mechanism to provide for a leak-before-burst design.  
An equivalent pressure relief mechanism can be a glass-to-metal seal that cracks to 
relieve pressure prior to header bursting.   
Secondary enclosures should be considered in the design.   
b. Cells with highly toxic or lethal electrolytes (greater than toxicology category 2), such as 
those in Li-BCX, Li-SOCl2, Li-SO2Cl2, and Li-SO2, shall not be used in or vented into 
habitable volumes. 
If used external to habitable volumes, operational safety controls should be implemented 
to protect personnel during pre- and post-mission processing. 
c. Cell seals shall be 100-percent leaked tested at flight cell and/or flight battery level. 
d. Cell seal design shall have positive margins over cell vent pressures, as specified in 
5.1.1.1e-g. 
e. Cells with welded seals shall follow the requirement stated in AWS C7.4/C7.4M:2008. 
f. Electrolyte absorbent material, containment, and/or a tortuous path for the exit of liquid 
electrolyte from the battery enclosure shall be used in the design.  
g. All internal surfaces of a metal battery enclosure shall be anodized and/or coated with a 
non-electrically conductive electrolyte-resistant paint to prevent a subsequent short 
circuit hazard as a result of electrolyte leakage.   
A nonmetallic battery case should be made of an electrolyte compatible material. 
h. Vent holes in the battery enclosure, if present, shall be covered with a gas 
permeable/liquid impermeable or electrolyte absorbent, nonflammable material to trap 
released liquid electrolyte.   
i. The seals of cell and battery designs shall be verified to work at worst-case mission 
operating conditions. 
Determination of worst-case condition should consider any two credible failures, such as 
loss of external cooling or an unanticipated load up to the limit of designed circuit 
protections, which may lead to off-nominal thermal conditions, to ensure the battery 
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design has adequate thermal management to keep cell and battery seals within their 
operating pressure and temperature limits. 
j. Cells with welded seal construction may also be enclosed in sealed containers.  If the 
sealed container is used as a control for fault tolerance to a catastrophic hazard, it shall be 
verified with test.   
k. If a container with a welded seal construction is used to contain toxic gas from being 
released into a habitable volume, then the sealed container shall be compliant with 
NASA-STD-5019 or an equivalent standard. 
 
5.3 Electrical Hazards 
 
Specific electrical hazards associated with batteries include electrical shock, arc-flash, and loss 
of power to critical safety systems.  
 
5.3.1 Sources of Electrical Shock, Corona, and Arc-Flash 
 
1. Personnel exposure to battery power terminals and/or sensor terminals. 
2. Failure of battery case, exposing high voltages. 
3. Failure of internal wiring, exposing high voltages to the case. 
4. Bridging of battery terminals, resulting in an arc-flash. 
5. Bridging of high voltage battery terminals with sharp edges, in a vacuum environment, 
resulting in a corona event. 
 
5.3.1.1 Requirements 
 
a. Batteries exceeding 40 Vdc shall provide hazard controls as specified in NASA-STD-
3001. 
b. Batteries exceeding 100 Vdc shall be assessed for arc-flash hazards. 
c. In battery designs where analysis shows an arc-flash risk, arc flash and shock personal 
protective equipment shall be employed when working in or around the battery. 
d. External shorts shall be controlled as documented in Section 5.1.3. 
e. Corona mitigation designs shall be incorporated as stated in JSC 29129 for high-voltage 
batteries used in a vacuum environment. 
 
5.3.2 Sources of Loss of Power 
 
1. Short circuit or overload leading to a designed interruption of power (fuse, etc.). 
2. Over-discharge of the battery beyond usable voltage levels caused by use beyond 
intended design, low temperatures that reduce battery capacity, failure controls that 
degrade performance, etc. 
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5.3.2.1 Requirements 
 
a. Batteries employed as the sole source of energy for critical safety systems shall be 
assessed for loss-of-power hazard. 
Incorporation of design features intended to constrain battery operation in order to 
optimize battery health, should consider if the equipment the battery is powering is 
deemed more critical than the battery health. The assessment should be used to determine 
the appropriate level and number of features whose failure could cause loss of electrical 
power.  If an off-nominal operation of the battery will be required for contingency, 
battery safety should be assessed prior to further use.  Battery health refers to factors 
that reduce its performance or life. 
 
5.4 Extreme Temperature Hazards 
 
Extreme battery temperatures can be hazards for the crew and ground personnel (touch 
temperatures) and can be a failure source for chemical exposure and fire/explosion hazards.  
 
From a battery perspective, high temperature occurs when the operating temperature of a battery 
or cell exceeds the upper temperature limit of the manufacturer's performance specifications, 
leading to hazards found in other sections, such as chemical exposure, explosion, fire, and loss of 
power.  
 
5.4.1 Sources 
 
1. External heating from the environment and/or surrounding equipment.  
2. Sustained short circuit/high discharge rates. 
3. Sustained high charge rates. 
4. Cell failure leading to thermal runaway and possible propagation to other cells in the 
battery. 
5. Failure of battery heaters leading to uncontrolled high or low temperatures.   
6. Failure of an active cooling system. 
7. Charging lithium-ion type batteries at very low temperatures causing lithium metal 
deposition that could subsequently lead to failures, including high temperatures, venting, 
and fire. 
8. Imbalanced internal resistances caused by temperature variations within a battery leading 
to large imbalances and thermal gradients. 
 
5.4.2 Requirements 
 
a. Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled during all mission phases to ensure that the 
crew is protected from extreme touch temperatures.  
The maximum allowable continuous touch temperature for surfaces in crewed spacecraft 
is 44 degrees Centigrade (°C) (112°F).  Warning labels should be employed for surface 
temperatures between 45 and 50°C (113 and 122°F), and should have protective 
measures above 50°C (122°F).  The minimum touch temperature for surfaces in crewed 
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spacecraft is 10°C (50°F).  The requirements and guidelines in NASA-STD-3001 should 
be consulted and followed.  
If the battery or cell will not be directly touched but is located near a surface that will be 
touched, temperature controls should be incorporated to prevent excessive battery or cell 
heat from transferring to the touchable surface. 
b. Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled and verified via test at worst-case mission 
environments to ensure that all cell temperatures remain within safe operating ranges 
specified by the manufacturer or verified by tests. 
Excessive battery and/or cell temperatures can lead to battery and/or cell leakage, 
venting, or fire/explosion.  
Thermal protective devices should be incorporated to protect batteries from going into a 
venting, fire, or thermal runaway condition.  Some examples include: 1) thermally 
actuated circuit breakers or thermostats set to interrupt the load current before the cell 
and/or battery temperature reaches a hazardous temperature, 2) heat sinks, 3) heat 
shunts, or 4) active cooling loops in the battery to remove internally generated heat from 
the cells and/or battery.  
Batteries should be installed such that they are isolated from potential external heat 
sources by thermal optimization of the on-board location of the battery to provide 
protection from convective, radiative, or conductive heat sources. 
Thermal analysis should be carried out to determine design characteristics that will 
minimize thermal gradients within a battery design.  
Heat sinks and heat dissipation and other thermal design features should be used to 
minimize sensible heating of the battery during operation as well as to minimize thermal 
gradients within the battery design to the degree necessary to meet mission requirements. 
c. External short circuits shall be controlled for the cells and battery assembly, as discussed 
in Section 5.1.3, to prevent heat generation resulting from high rates of discharge. 
d. Validated thermal analysis and testing shall be performed to confirm that the battery cells 
will not be exposed to temperatures below the manufacturer’s rating or the limit 
established by qualification tests.   
Heaters or equivalent devices and methods should be used if charging is required in 
thermal environments that are below the safe charging temperature of the battery. 
e. Thermal extremes due to thermal runaway propagation shall be addressed as discussed in 
Section 5.1.5.  
f. Battery heaters shall be designed with appropriate levels of failure tolerance to prevent 
excessive heating of the battery and/or cells. 
Where practical, the heater should be designed such that maximum heat input at 
maximum environmental temperature would not result in any one cell exceeding the 
specified maximum operating temperature.  When this is not possible, redundant high-
temperature cutoff thermostats should be used.  Hardware controls are preferred over 
software/firmware controls.  
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The effects of differential thermal expansion and contraction between dissimilar 
materials, such as plastic cell cases and metal battery cases, should be incorporated in 
the verification of the battery design if the battery will experience significantly low or 
high temperatures from external or internal sources.  For example, plastic cell cases 
should not be "pinned" to a metal battery case by cement, hard potting, or mechanical 
means.  Resilient filler material may be required inside the battery case to absorb 
dimensional changes resulting from thermal expansion/contraction changes.  In 
prismatic cell designs, the battery case structure should be designed to withstand or 
negate the stresses induced by cell swelling.  The direction of cell swelling during 
discharge varies for cell shapes and chemistries.  Most prismatic cells swell in the 
direction normal to the plane of their electrodes (flat face of cells). 
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6. SAFETY RELEVANT TO SPECIFIC BATTERY CHEMISTRIES 
 
Battery users frequently request a listing of batteries "approved" for use onboard crewed space 
vehicles.  Since the safe use of a battery is partially application specific, there can be no such list.  
Any battery that can be made safe to fly in the crewed space vehicle environment can be used; 
however, there are some batteries that are not practical to make safe.  For example, lithium-sulfur 
dioxide cells have built-in overpressure vents that will release SO2 (sulfur dioxide) gas and other 
electrolyte components that are highly toxic; thus, these are unacceptable in the habitable area of 
a space vehicle.  However, that chemistry has been used safely in the non-pressurized areas of 
crewed spacecraft.  Note that the thrust possible from a cell/battery venting incident should be 
addressed for possible impacts to vehicle mission.  When at all possible, it is better to build a 
battery using a cell chemistry and cell design that is inherently safe on its own for space vehicle 
use rather than applying extensive (and often costly) modifications to make an inherently 
unsuitable cell acceptable for crewed flight use. 
 
Batteries can be categorized into three main types: primary, secondary, and reserve.  The primary 
batteries are typically one-time usage types and are not capable of being charged after they are 
depleted.  The secondary batteries are those that can be recharged.  The reserve batteries are 
those in which the active materials are mixed just before use. 
 
The following is a historical list of cell chemistries, both primary (nonrechargeable) and 
secondary (rechargeable), which have been flown on crewed space vehicles.   
 
 Alkaline-manganese primary  
 LeClanche (carbon-zinc) primary  
 Lead-acid secondary cells having immobilized electrolyte 
 Lithium/lithium-ion polymer secondary (including lithium-polymer variation) 
 Lithium metal anode primary cells having the following cathodic (positive) active 
materials: 
 Poly-carbon monofluoride 
 Iodine 
 Manganese dioxide 
 Silver chromate  
 Sulfur dioxide (external to habitable spaces only) 
 Thionyl chloride 
 Thionyl chloride with bromine chloride complex additive (Li-BCX) 
 Iron disulfide 
 Lithium sulfur 
 Mercuric oxide-zinc primary 
 Nickel-cadmium secondary   
 Nickel-hydrogen secondary 
 Nickel-metal hydride secondary 
 Silver-zinc primary and secondary 
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 Zinc-air primary 
 Sodium-sulfur secondary (external to habitable space) 
 Thermal batteries 
 
There are additional battery chemistries that are emerging in commercial/industrial prominence.  
Use of these chemistries should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis for use in crewed flight. 
 
Often the cells used in batteries for crewed space vehicle are commercially available.  A special 
"government" purchase is not required for alkaline, zinc-air, and lithium coin cells; however, 
minimal screening tests are required of sample commercial cells to ensure the cells will perform 
in the required load and environment without leakage or failure (see Appendix A, Tables A-3 
and A-4).  Specific certification tests may also be required of a battery depending on its 
application and design.  Often a certificate of compliance regarding manufacturing processes and 
shelf life data is required by Safety and Mission Assurance personnel responsible for certifying 
the hardware, so designers are cautioned to inquire ahead of time regarding necessary 
documentation. 
 
To ensure that cells are fresh for flight use, shelf-life limits from the date the cells are 
manufactured have been established for the various chemistries.   See Appendix C for more 
details on shelf and service life.  Battery providers need to keep in mind that stowage of a cell 
with a bypass diode across the cell/battery terminals can cause a slow drain of capacity of the 
cell, thus lowering the service life.   
 
Rechargeable cells typically are stowed late to retain a good charge on the cells for flight use.  
Rechargeable cells generally have a faster self-discharge rate than primary cells, so some launch 
delays could force a hardware exchange with freshly charged cells or a recharge on the launch 
pad (with prior approval).  In cases where large nickel-hydrogen batteries will require charging 
in a space vehicle on the launch pad, consideration should be given to see that adequate cooling 
of the battery is available.   
 
6.1  Alkaline Primary Batteries 
 
6.1.1  Definition 
 
Alkaline manganese dioxide cells were introduced in the early 1960’s and have become the most 
dominant battery cell in use today.  They have higher energy density, better service and shelf 
life, and better resistance to leakage than the carbon-zinc cell.  The cell is typically of a bobbin 
(or button) design. 
 
The basic electrochemical processes taking place in these alkaline cells are: 
 
Anode: Zn + 2 OH
-
    Zn(OH)2 + 2 e
-
  
Cathode:  2MnO2 + H2O + 2 e
-
  2MnOOH + 2 OH-  
The overall reaction is: Zn + 2MnO2 + 2H2O   Zn(OH)2 + 2MnOOH  
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The anode is made up of zinc powder and the cathode of manganese dioxide powder.  The 
electrolyte is 35 percent KOH.  The nominal voltage of alkaline cells ranges from 1.5 to 1.6 V, 
and most of their capacity is consumed when the voltage drops to about 1.0 V.  The shelf life is 
between 8 to 10 years: however, due to the high tendency of leakage, they are not stored for 
more than 3 years. 
 
6.1.2  Hazard Sources 
 
As with any aqueous electrolyte, the cell can generate flammable mixtures of hydrogen and 
oxygen.  The KOH electrolyte is extremely caustic and can cause damage to eyes, skin, and 
mucous membranes, as well as corrosion of metals.  In short circuit conditions, these cells can 
exceed touch temperature limits and swell to the point that removal from cylindrical constraints 
becomes difficult.  
 
6.1.3  Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. The battery boxes used for alkaline cells should be vented and have a nonconductive 
coating and absorbent material.   
b. Alkaline cells in sizes D or smaller with a maximum of 12 V and/or 60 Wh  
[Wh = Cell Capacity (Ah) × Cell Voltage (V)] and with cells either all in series or all in 
parallel and with no potential charging source and with the cells located in a vented 
compartment, should be listed on the JSC Form 1298 as they fall under the non-critical 
category. 
c. An EP-Form should be used to obtain approval for these batteries and presented along 
with the respective safety data packages.  
d. The EP-Form should include cell product information, Underwriters Laboratory (UL) 
safety test data, and a circuit schematic showing the safety circuitry (e.g., fuses, diodes, 
etc.).  In the absence of UL data and/or safety circuitry, testing should be performed to 
provide this safety data.   
e. For cells and batteries listed in the above noncritical category (6.1.3.b), flight acceptance 
testing should include vacuum leak checks with functional tests before and after.  The 
vacuum exposure will be to approximately 0.1 psi for 6 hours for batteries used in 
habitable environments. 
f. For batteries that do not fall within the above category, a complete engineering, 
qualification, and flight acceptance test program should be completed and a Unique 
Hazard Report should be submitted.  
g. Alkaline cells should not be left in devices that are not operated for more than 1 year.  If 
devices will not be used for more than 1 year, the alkaline cells should be removed and 
discarded after each use. 
h. Alkaline cells that are partially used should not be stored and reused.  Tracking of 
performance for each cell is cost and time prohibitive; hence, they should be discarded in 
dry trash after each use.  
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6.2 Alkaline Secondary Batteries 
 
6.2.1  Definition 
 
In the early 1990’s, "rechargeable" alkaline cells entered the commercial cell market.  
Historically, alkaline cells have been used solely as primary, nonrechargeable cells.  Alkaline 
cells being advertised as rechargeable are sold with a special charger that should be used, 
following strict instructions, in order to achieve rechargeability.  However, since their 
performance and capacity is significantly less than alternative primaries, a comparison with a 
nickel-metal hydride battery design is advised before this option.   
 
6.2.2  Hazard Sources 
 
Due to the hazards associated with charging cells and the strict routine that should be followed 
for processing these cells through charge/discharge cycles, flight hardware using "rechargeable" 
alkaline cells should be on a case-by-case basis.  Since the commercial chargers typically lack 
the type of fail-safe controls required for use of the hardware in the space vehicle environment, 
the use of the commercial chargers should be restricted.  A thorough evaluation of the charger 
design is required to identify the hazard controls inherent in the design, if any, and the missing 
hazard controls.  The applicable hazards detailed in subsections of Section 4.0 should be 
accounted for in the design, especially controls concerning the hazards associated with gas 
generation, high temperature, and charging. 
 
6.2.3  Controls/Process Requirements 
 
The controls from Section 5 are applicable here.  In addition, the applicable controls detailed in 
subsections of Section 5 should be accounted for in the design, especially controls concerning 
the hazards associated with charging. 
 
6.3 Lead-Acid Batteries 
 
6.3.1  Definition 
 
The practical lead-acid battery traces its origins to 1860 and is one of the few batteries with acid 
electrolyte (battery acid).  Since this battery generates hydrogen during charge and discharge and 
on open circuit, the Vent Regulated Lead Acid (VRLA) battery is not to be flown without a 
waiver.  The Sealed Lead Acid (SLA) battery cell is designed to contain any hydrogen generated 
within the cell case.   
 
The half-reactions in a lead-acid battery are the following: 
 
Anode: Pb     Pb2+ + 2e- 
  Pb
2+
 + SO4
2-   PbSO4   
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Cathode:  PbO2 + 4H
+
 + 2e
-
   Pb2+ + 2H2O 
  Pb
2+
 + SO4
2-
   PbSO4   
The overall reaction is:  Pb + PbO2 + H2SO4   2PbSO4 + 2H2O  
The anode in lead acid cells is made up of a sponge-like metallic lead, and the cathode is lead 
dioxide (PbO2) in both α and β forms.  The α form contributes to a higher cycle life, although it 
is slightly less electrochemically active and lower in gravimetric energy density.  The electrolyte 
is sulfuric acid of about 37 percent by weight (approximately 2M H2SO4) and a specific gravity 
of 1.26 to 1.28 when fully charged. 
 
The operating voltage of the cell is typically 2.0 to 1.75 V; however, the cell can be discharged 
down to 1.0 V.  Lead-acid cells are charged using a constant voltage protocol to 2.39 V, and 
because most of these are used as uninterruptible power sources, they should be kept fully 
charged at a float voltage between 2.17 to 2.25 V, with this voltage being dependent on the 
nature of the anode and the specific gravity of the electrolyte.  A shelf life of 7 years can be 
obtained if the cells are maintained at a float voltage when not in use. 
 
6.3.2  Hazard Sources 
 
a. The traditional concerns with lead-acid batteries are hydrogen generation and loss of 
electrolyte containment.   
b. This cell chemistry is capable of extremely high current rates, which could result in burns 
to the crew or overheating of improperly protected electronic components. 
 
6.3.3  Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. Appropriate absorbent materials should be used to contain any electrolyte vented from 
the cells.   
b. Fusing components should be used to limit the maximum discharge capability of the 
battery.   
c. All batteries should be two-fault tolerant to overcharge and external short hazards (see 
Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively). 
d. All batteries should undergo engineering, qualification, and flight acceptance testing.  
e. Sample lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells and 
batteries procured for the same application.   
 
6.4 Lithium-ion Secondary Batteries 
 
6.4.1 Definition 
 
Lithium-ion batteries are rechargeable batteries and have a high voltage cathode such as LiMO2 
(M = Co, Ni, Mn, Al, or combinations of these) or LiFePO4 (and derivatives of this olivine 
material).  The anode is usually a form of carbon or LiTi4O5 or lithium alloys of Si or Sn.  The 
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electrolyte in these cells is made up of a combination of organic carbonates and a salt.  The most 
commonly used salt is LiPF6 (lithium hexafluorophosphate).  Other salts such as LiBOB (lithium 
bisoxalato borate) or LiBF4 (lithium tetrafluoroborate) have also been used.  The charge and 
discharge in the lithium-ion cells occurs by the process of intercalation and deintercalation, 
respectively, as shown in the equations below.  
 
Positive LiMO2     Li1-xMO2 + xLi
+
 + xe 
Negative C + xLi
+
 + xe    LixC 
Overall LiMO2 + C     LixC + Li1-xMO2 
 
The nominal voltage of lithium-ion cells is about 3.6 V, and the highest energy density obtained 
from a state-of-the-art cell is currently greater than 230 Wh/kg.  The typical charging protocol 
for the lithium-ion cells includes a constant current charge to a voltage of 4.1 V or 4.2 V 
(depending on the metal oxide cathode and manufacturer’s recommendations) and a hold at 
constant voltage until the current falls down to approximately C/100 (this can vary according to 
the manufacturer).  Due to the unique charging characteristic of the lithium-ion cells and 
batteries, charging should be performed with a dedicated charger only.  This charger may be a 
“smart” charger in some cases.  If a dedicated charger does not exist, the equipment used for 
charging should have adequate controls so as to not impose an overcharge, overcurrent, or 
overvoltage condition on the battery.  The discharge of the cell depends on the load used, but the 
end voltage during discharge should not go below manufacturer’s specified voltage.  Typical end 
of discharge voltages for the batteries in different equipment has been 3.0 V/cell.  Internal 
resistance for the lithium-ion cells varies from 80 to 120 mΩ for low-capacity (1 to 3 Ah) cells to 
about 0.8 mΩ for high-capacity (190-Ah) cells. 
 
Lithium-ion cells typically are spiral wound or prismatic.  Under the prismatic types there are 
true prismatics, which are stacked flat plates, and others that are folded over to give a prismatic 
appearance.  A third variety that is increasingly common in the market today is the elliptic 
cylindrical type, where the spiral wound stack is flattened to give a prismatic appearance.  
Typically, the commercial cells used in cellular phones are prismatic cells, while those used in 
camcorders, cameras, and PCs are spiral wound cylindrical cells.  Lithium-ion cells have  
100-percent energy efficiency through most of their cycle life (input energy is equal to output 
energy).  While commercial cylindrical cells are either case negative or case positive, most of the 
prismatic cells above 5-Ah capacity are either case neutral or case positive. 
 
Commercial cylindrical cells (e.g., 18650, 26650, etc.) have three levels of protection.  These are 
the PTC current limiters, current interrupt device (CID), and the shutdown separator.  The PTC 
device is activated in the case of external short/overcurrent and over-temperature conditions.  
The CID is activated when the cells build up excessive pressure that usually occurs when the 
cells are overcharged to voltages close to or above 5 V.  The shutdown separator is activated 
when the cells reach a certain temperature that causes a meltdown of the middle polyethylene 
charge
discharge
charge
discharge
charge
discharge
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layer of the three-layer separator.  This usually occurs at about 130ºC (266ºF).  Not all lithium-
ion cells have a shutdown separator.  Commercial cell designs today have a ceramic-coated 
separator that is expected to be more robust to shorting events.  The cells also have a vent that is 
rated to vent above 150 psi.  However, in most of the cell designs under discussion here, the 
shutdown separator and vent activate near or above the onset of thermal runaway temperatures 
and are not typically considered to be safety controls.  Furthermore, venting of flammable gases 
will result in flames, sparks, and fire in the presence of an oxygen atmosphere, which in a 
majority of cases may evolve from cathode decomposition inside the cell. 
 
High-capacity cells consist of the shutdown separator, vents, and a fusible link to the electrode as 
possible levels of protection.  The shutdown separator is activated when the cells reach 
temperatures close to 130ºC (266ºF).  The fusible link melts at specific current levels, which then 
inhibits any hazardous occurrences during an external short condition.  The vent typically 
operates above 150 psi, and cells typically do not perform after a vent.  These safety features are 
not always effective at mitigating a safety incident. 
 
The SOC and temperature at which the cells are stored or cycled greatly affects the irreversible 
capacity loss in the cells.  For example, one commercial cell in a period of storage for 1 year 
exhibited less than a 2-percent loss at 0-percent SOC and 0ºC, whereas it exhibited about  
13-percent loss at 100-percent SOC and 40ºC.  The temperature and the DoD to which the cells 
are cycled also affect the deliverable capacity of the cells with cycle life. 
 
6.4.2 Hazard Sources 
 
The main abuse conditions that cause hazards in lithium-ion cells are the result of overcharge, 
internal and external shorts, and high temperatures.  Although over-discharge is in itself not a 
hazard, it can cause development of high resistance and cell conditions that can subsequently 
lead to a hazard.   
 
Studies have shown that overcharge conditions can lead to the deposition of lithium metal that 
can create internal shorts in the cell.  The electrolyte in the lithium-ion cells contains flammable 
organic solvents, and under high voltage conditions they decompose, leading to the formation of 
gases (e.g., carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and other gaseous decomposition products).  This 
can cause overpressure conditions inside the cell, leading to smoke and flame if the gases are not 
vented benignly.  Rapid charging at temperatures below the manufacturer’s specification can 
also cause deposition of lithium dendrites.  However, lithium dendrite formation can be 
mitigated if the charge current is lowered per the manufacturer’s specification or is limited to 
less than full SOC. 
 
External short of lithium-ion cells of the high and low impedance types can also result in high 
temperatures and pressures inside the cell, resulting in venting, fire, thermal runaway, and/or 
explosions. 
 
The lithium-ion cells under simulated internal short conditions have shown to exhibit venting, 
fire, and smoke, as well as thermal runaway.  Simulated internal short tests can determine the 
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tolerance of particular cell designs to internal shorts.  However, most lithium-ion cell designs 
have been shown to be intolerant to internal shorts, especially at high SOCs.   
 
Internal shorts can occur in two ways.  One is due to poor quality control in the cell 
manufacturing process that causes impurities and contaminants to be present as latent defects 
inside the cell that can later pierce the separator, causing an internal short circuit that can result 
in electrolyte leakage, fire, and thermal runaway.  This cause is mitigated by the DFMR 
approach specified herein.  The second cause for this event results from abuse such as 
overcharge and over-discharge or extreme temperatures.  Internal shorts can occur when cells are 
used beyond their specifications, such as charge and discharge rates beyond the cell’s capability, 
exceeding end-of-charge or end-of discharge voltages, and exceeding operational temperature 
ranges.  Such excesses can cause the deposition of metallic dendrites of copper and lithium.  
Localized intense heat due to impurities or dendrite formation provides the environment for a fire 
in the presence of a flammable organic electrolyte.  Aluminum metal current collector 
contributes to the thermal runaway of a cell when internal temperatures reach the melting 
temperature of aluminum (~660°C).   This second cause is to be controlled by a failure tolerance 
approach.   
 
Over-discharge conditions lead to the electrodeposition of copper on the anode, cathode, and 
separator, causing the formation of a short circuit condition.  Gas formation due to 
decomposition of electrolyte under/over-discharge conditions have also been reported in the 
literature [32, 33].  In most cases, over-discharge, even into reversal, is benign and results in a 
shorted (dead) cell.   However, subsequent charges of multi-cell modules with one or more cells 
that experience over-discharge can cause other cells to go into an overcharge condition.  The 
tolerance of a cell to over-discharge conditions (voltage, etc.) should be characterized for battery 
designs before safety controls are set. 
 
Lithium-ion cells under very high temperature conditions [above 150C (302F)] can vent, 
smoke, and exhibit thermal runaway accompanied by fire and/or an expulsion of can contents 
through the vent holes in the cell or through the bursting of the cell header. 
 
6.4.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. As with all rechargeable crewed spacecraft batteries, lithium-ion secondary batteries 
should include design features and operational protocols to provide failure tolerance to 
misuse and off-nominal operating conditions beyond cell manufacturer’s and/or verified 
voltage, current, temperature, and life limits.  
b. Engineering and qualification testing of lithium-ion batteries and cells, lot certification, 
acceptance testing, and screening of flight batteries should be performed on all batteries 
that do not fall under the noncritical category (guiding documents include EP-WI-015, 
EP-WI-031, and JSC 66548.)   
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6.4.3.1  Engineering Evaluation, Development, and Design 
 
COTS Applications 
 
a. In the case of COTS lithium-ion batteries, features that should be characterized for the 
battery include the fuse rating; the operational characteristics (voltage) of the overcharge, 
overcurrent, and over-discharge protection switches; and the details of operation of the 
protective circuitry.   
b. For lithium-ion batteries of the COTS type, less than 12 V and up to 60 Wh, test data 
should be provided to show at least single-fault tolerance.  The second level of control 
should be supported with existing test data or manufacturer data.   
c. Batteries of the COTS type, less than 12 V and up to 60 Wh, should be from a single lot, 
and the battery safety circuitry should be provided for review with the evaluation package 
and hazard report.    
d. For all lithium-ion button cells, the cell specification, UL safety test data, and the safety 
circuitry should be provided for evaluation and inclusion with the standardized hazard 
reports. 
 
Custom Designs 
 
a. The lithium-ion batteries should undergo performance and abuse tests at the cell and 
battery level as part of the engineering evaluation test program.   
1. The performance tests should include, as a minimum, physical characterization 
(i.e., dimensions and weight), electrochemical characterization (i.e., OCV, closed 
circuit voltage (CCV), internal resistance/impedance, capacity checks), mission 
profile performance, and vacuum leak checks.   
2. The abuse tests should consist of, as a minimum, overcharge, over-discharge, 
external short (i.e., low and smart impedance (an impedance necessary to draw 
current just below the current limiter designed limit)), internal short/crush, heat-
to-vent, vibration, drop, and vent and burst pressure determination.   
3. Some of the features that should be characterized for the battery are the fuse 
rating, the operational characteristics (voltage) of the overcharge and over-
discharge protection switches, and the details of operation of the protective 
circuitry.   
b. Safety devices incorporated into the cell, if any, should be tested and documented (e.g., 
PTC devices, CIDs, shutdown separator, etc.).   
c. For custom-designed batteries, cell voltage monitoring consistent with 4.4.3 should be 
provided. 
d. For custom-designed batteries, battery-level current monitoring consistent with 4.4.3 
should be provided for all phases of a mission from ground testing to return and landing. 
e. For large custom-designed batteries (greater than 12 V and 60 Wh), thermal analyses 
should be carried out to determine the battery design and configuration that would 
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provide the optimum heat dissipation and the least thermal gradient over the entire 
battery (recommended range of <3 °C).  
f. For custom-designed batteries, temperature monitoring consistent with 4.4.3 should be 
provided based on high-fidelity thermal analysis to determine the optimum number of 
thermal sensors required to monitor and protect the batteries for nominal and off-nominal 
conditions. 
 
Battery Charging 
 
a. Charging and other ground and flight operations should not impose any hazards on the 
battery pack that is being charged.   
1. Lithium-ion batteries should be charged with a dedicated charger or a universal 
“smart” charger that recognizes the battery chemistry via the use of unique 
electrically erasable programmable read-only memory or equivalent method of 
identification.  In the event that a dedicated charger is not used or an alternative 
charging method is used, adequate controls should be in place to prevent any one 
cell or a battery pack from going into an overvoltage, overcurrent, or overcharge 
condition.   
2. The charger, charging equipment, charge circuitry, or charging protocol should be 
evaluated under normal operating conditions to understand its characteristics and 
verify its safety.    
3. It should be verified that the battery charging equipment (if not the dedicated 
charger) has at least two levels of control that will prevent it from causing a 
hazardous condition on the battery being charged. 
4. The COTS chargers, if used to charge the batteries on-orbit, should be from a 
single lot, and charger circuitry should be provided with the standard hazard 
report for review and approval. 
5. The overcharge controls should be consistent with the dissimilar redundancy 
requirements of Section 4. 
 
6.4.3.2  Qualification Testing 
 
a. For COTS lithium-ion button cells of up to 300 mAh capacity, a standard hazard report 
used for non-critical batteries with UL safety test data is sufficient for documentation of 
the battery. 
Lithium-ion button cells of up to 300 mAh capacity that cannot be removed from the 
equipment (e.g., cell soldered to circuit board) may be qualified at the end-item level. 
b. The pass/fail criteria for the recheck of the functional baseline should be set stringently to 
determine any failures, including subtle failures due to cell internal manufacturing 
defects. 
For example, COTS battery programs use a less-than-0.5-percent change in OCV and 
mass and a less-than-3-percent capacity change as pass/fail criteria.  
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6.4.3.3 Acceptance Testing 
 
a. All flight cells and batteries should undergo acceptance testing that includes, as a 
minimum, verification of battery performance to mission requirements by 
charge/discharge cycling, vibration, and vacuum leak checks.   
b. Acceptance testing should include a minimum of 10 charge/discharge cycles to screen for 
latent defects and infant mortalities.  The required number of cycles can be achieved 
using the total of cycles performed at the vendor, during cell acceptance screening, at 
sub-battery assembly, and at the completed assembly level.  
c. The vibration levels and spectrum used to screen the qualification and flight batteries for 
the occurrence of internal shorts should be higher than what is obtained from the 
calculation of mission requirements (Appendix A). 
d. In the event that cell-level controls are used as safety controls, irrespective of the cell size 
and design, test data should be provided to prove that these devices are effectively 
working as designed in the flight lot of cells.  
e. For custom battery designs, the flight lot of cells should be 100-percent visually inspected 
(e.g., corrosion, bulging, scratches, dents and deformations, misaligned seals, electrolyte 
leakage, contaminants in the seal, etc.).  
f. For custom battery designs made of small-capacity, high-volume commercial cells, the 
flight lot of cells should be acceptance screened to remove ±3-sigma outliers for the 
following minimum performance parameters: OCV, mass, dimensions, DC internal 
resistance and/or AC impedance, leak check, charge and discharge capacity, and charge 
or voltage retention.  (For large lot sizes of cells, dimensional screening can be performed 
using “go/no-go” jigs or gauges.)  Cells with temporary discrepancies should be rejected.  
EP-WI-031 can be used for cell acceptance testing of lots of lithium-ion cells.  To ensure 
only lots with adequate performance uniformity pass, after removing outlier cells, the 
resultant ±3*σ  range for the following parameters as a percentage of the mean  
(±3-sigma range/mean) should not exceed the following: 
1. OCV (<1%) 
2. Mass (<2%) 
3. Capacity (<5%) 
4. DC and AC resistance (<15%)  
If the total number of cells that fail the acceptance screening criteria is greater than  
15 percent of the lot, then the lot is rejected. 
The following flow takes advantage of the low cost of high-volume commercial cells and 
assumes a large quantity of cells within the sample set that can be screened down to flight 
set.  In addition, this flow imposes a uniformity requirement such that the 6-sigma range 
(±3-sigma range width) is narrow by requiring that it be less than a percentage of the 
mean.  These strict uniformity requirements may not be suitable for large-capacity cell 
designs, as these are often lower volume, and uniformity is often not as tight as on the 
smaller, high-volume commercial cells. 
January 2014                  JSC 20793 Rev C 
 
52 
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Figure 6.4.3-1.  Cell Acceptance Flow with Large Numbers of Smaller, High-Volume  
Commercial Cells 
In this case, subsequent iterations yield a flight lot that is tightly grouped.  As a result, the 
cell matching that follows becomes a formality. 
In the event that large-capacity, lower volume cells are planned for the flight build, a 
different flow may be more suitable, as generally there are fewer cells to work with at the 
beginning of the screening.  In this case, additional screening iterations may not be 
possible with the limited number of high-cost cells involved.  In addition, cell matching 
takes a more prominent role. 
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Figure 6.4.3-2.  Cell Acceptance Flow with Small Numbers of Larger, Lower Volume  
Custom Cells 
g. Within the cells that fall into the ±3-sigma range, the following parameters may be used 
for matching cells: OCV, mass, capacity, DC resistance, and AC impedance.   
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h. For custom batteries, the “as received” cell OCV measurement is an excellent screen for 
identifying charge retention (soft short) outliers if the time between the last time the SOC 
was set and the measurement is made is over 1 year.  If that time delay is not possible, 
then one method for screening cells with soft shorts is to deeply and slowly discharge the 
cells to 0-percent SOC at the lowest operational constant voltage set by the manufacturer 
and observe the bounce-back of the OCV over a 14-day period.  Declining OCVs from a 
maximum over the 14-day stand can be indicative of a soft short and pass/fail criteria 
should be set accordingly.  
i. For custom battery designs, 100 percent of the flight batteries should undergo acceptance 
screening that includes visual inspection, OCV, mass, dimensions, DC internal resistance, 
vibration to higher levels (Appendix C), and leak check with charge and discharge 
capacity checks before and after the vibration check.  The pass/fail criteria should be 
stringent in order to recognize subtle failures or defects and should be based on the 
results of the qualification test program. 
j. For COTS battery designs, 100 percent of the flight batteries should undergo acceptance 
screening that should remove ±3-sigma outliers in the following minimum performance 
parameters: visual inspection, OCV, mass, dimensions, DC internal resistance, leak 
check, and charge and discharge capacity.  The flight acceptance tests should include, as 
a minimum, baseline physical and electrochemical tests, vibration to relevant levels 
(Appendix C) and vacuum leak checks with baseline physical and electrochemical tests 
performed before and after the vibration and vacuum leak checks.  The pass/fail criteria 
should be stringent.  For example, COTS battery programs use less than 1-percent change 
in OCV and mass and less than 3-percent capacity change as pass/fail criteria.  If greater 
than 3 percent of the lot fails, then the lot is rejected.   
For COTS lithium-ion button cells of up to 300 mAh capacity, flight cells should undergo 
acceptance testing that includes functional and vacuum leak checks.   
Lithium-ion button cells that cannot be removed from the equipment (e.g., cell soldered to 
circuit board) may be functionally checked at the end-item level. 
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 Figure 6.4.3-3.  COTS Battery Acceptance Flow 
 
6.5 Lithium/Lithium-ion Polymer Secondary Batteries 
 
6.5.1  Definition 
 
Lithium/lithium-ion polymer batteries are rechargeable batteries and have polymer blends in the 
cathode or anode or separator or in all three.  In the polymer cells, flat, bonded electrodes are 
used to enable the fabrication of thin cells.  The cells could be made in flexible shapes and sizes 
and packaged in aluminized plastic pouches.  Although the commercial market labels all polymer 
batteries as “lithium-polymer” batteries, most of those in the market today are of the lithium-ion 
polymer type.  These are called lithium-ion polymers as they contain electrode formulations and 
some liquid electrolyte that are similar in composition to lithium-ion cells and do not contain a 
purely polymeric electrolyte or lithium metal electrode. 
   
The electrochemical nature of these cells is very similar to the liquid electrolyte lithium-ion cells 
dealt with in the previous section.  These cells have a LiMO2 cathode (M = Co, Ni, Mn, or 
combinations of these).  The commonly used cathodes in lithium/lithium-ion polymer cells are 
Li-Mn2O4 spinel compounds.  The anode can be any form of carbon, namely, natural and 
synthetic graphites, mesophase carbon micro beads (MCMB), or carbon fibers (lithium-ion 
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polymer cells).  The anode can also be lithium metal (lithium polymer cells).  The electrolyte in 
these cells is made up of a combination of organic carbonates and a salt in a polymer matrix.  
The most commonly used salt is LiPF6 (lithium hexafluorophosphate).  The polymers commonly 
used are based on polyacrylonitriles (PANs), PVDF-based polymers (PVDF-HFP, PVDF-
CTFE), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), etc.  In some cases, an ancillary plasticizer such as dibutyl 
phthalate is incorporated into the resin, which facilitates the densification of the electrodes under 
low temperature and pressure.  The plasticizer is later vaporized or removed by a suitable solvent 
extraction process.  The charge and discharge in the lithium/lithium-ion cells occurs in a manner 
similar to that described in Section 6.4. 
 
The nominal voltage of the lithium-ion polymer cells with the cobaltate cathode is about 3.6 V 
and the energy density obtained can range from 145 to 190 Wh/kg.  The lithium-ion polymer 
cells with the manganese spinel cathode have a nominal voltage of about 3.8 V and have energy 
densities in the range of 130 to 144 Wh/kg.  The typical charging protocol for the 
lithium/lithium-ion polymer cells includes a constant current charge to a voltage of 4.1 V or  
4.2 V (depending on the metal oxide cathode and manufacturer’s recommendations) and held at 
constant voltage until the current falls down to approximately C/100 (this can vary according to 
the manufacturer).  Due to the unique charging characteristic of the lithium-ion cells and 
batteries, charging should be performed with a dedicated charger only.  This charger can be a 
“smart” charger in some cases.  Lithium polymer cells may sometimes require higher 
temperatures for operation (about 60 ºC (140 ºF)).  The discharge of the cell depends on the load 
used, but the end voltage during discharge should not go below 2.5 V.  Typical end-of-discharge 
voltages for the batteries in different equipment have been 3.0 V/cell.  Internal resistance for the 
lithium-ion polymer cells varies from 20 to 60 mΩ for small (0.5 to 15 Ah) cells and is expected 
to drop with increased capacity cells. 
 
Lithium/lithium-ion polymer cells are typically flat and thin.  The cells are packaged in vapor-
impermeable, flexible, multilayer metalized polymer bags.  The polymer cells are typically made 
up of a positive electrode plate and a negative electrode plate bonded to two opposite sides of an 
ionically conductive separator.  The plates can be stacked as individual plates, Z-folded, or 
folded in other ways depending on the mechanical properties of the individual component layers.  
A large-capacity cell would thus have several plates stacked on each other to give the capacity 
required.  Another common method of cell stacking is the “bicell” configuration, where the 
central plate (typically a negative electrode) is shared by two positive plates on either side.  
There is a layer of separator between the center negative plate and the two positive plates on 
either side.  Several bicells can be stacked to give a larger capacity cell. 
 
Polymer cells typically perform well at low rates of charge and discharge.  However, cells can be 
made for specific medium and high rate applications.  Because of the higher resistance caused by 
the polymer materials used in the electrodes and separator, currently, a small quantity of liquid 
electrolyte is added to improve ionic conductivity.   
 
The SOC and temperature at which the cells are stored or cycled greatly affects the irreversible 
capacity loss in the cells.  These are similar to the liquid lithium-ion cells.  
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The polymer cells do not have the same safety features that a liquid lithium-ion cell would have.  
The only safety feature in the cell is the shutdown separator that works in a manner similar to 
that of the liquid systems.  With the polymer cells, due to the nature of the cell design and 
package, the cell seals lose integrity under abusive conditions, leading to electrolyte leakage.  
But, due to the presence of very little electrolyte compared with the liquid cells, the hazards 
associated with them are less.  The presence of the gel polymer can cause a self-healing process 
in instances of nail penetration in a fully charged state and hence reduces the occurrence of 
explosions or fires. 
 
6.5.2 Hazard Sources 
 
The main abuse conditions that cause hazardous conditions in lithium/lithium-ion polymer cells 
are the result of overcharge, internal and external shorts, and high temperatures.  These are 
similar to those for the liquid lithium-ion cells, discussed in Section 5.4.  However, the polymer 
lithium-ion cells have additional problems with electrolyte leakage under abusive conditions and 
corrosion of polymer pouches.  These pouch-design cells are also intolerant to vacuum 
conditions and undergo swelling.   
 
6.5.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
The controls for the polymer cell batteries are similar to those for the lithium-ion liquid systems.  
The battery should be failure tolerant to overcharge, over-discharge conditions, external short 
(high and low impedance), and extreme temperature hazards.   Although an over-discharge 
condition has not been deemed to be a hazard in lithium-ion cells, subsequent charges can cause 
a hazardous condition in one or more cells in a multi-cell pack.  The controls and processes listed 
in Sections 5 and 6.4 (lithium-ion) should be used as applicable to incorporate safety controls 
into the battery design.  
 
In addition, the following should be taken into account while using the lithium-ion polymer cells. 
 
a. The lithium-ion polymer cells should be tested in an environment of 8 to 10 psi pressure 
for the flight acceptance leak test rather than the vacuum (~0.1 psi) or deep vacuum  
(~10
–5
 Torr).  In addition, the pouch cell designs should be leak tested with the pressure 
restraints on the wide faces of the cells to prevent damage due to pouch expansion.  The 
restraint pressure should be obtained from the cell manufacturer.  The cells should be 
restrained at all times to prevent inadvertent swelling during storage, cycling, and low 
pressure or vacuum environments. 
b. Cells should be stringently monitored for any signs of voltage decay, visual evidence of 
external corrosion, or inadequate isolation of the terminals from the pouch. 
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6.6 Lithium Primary Batteries 
 
6.6.1 Definition 
 
Lithium batteries of the primary or nonrechargeable type are of several different chemistries.  In 
most cases, primary lithium cells have a lithium metal anode.  Cells of this chemistry have a 
nonaqueous electrolyte that is either organic or inorganic in nature.  Depending on the cathode 
present, the nominal voltage of the cell differs.  The most commonly used lithium primary 
batteries for space applications are lithium manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2), lithium iron disulfide 
(LiFeS2), lithium polycarbon monofluoride (LiCFx), lithium thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2), and 
lithium bromine chloride complex (Li-BCX).  The less commonly used ones are lithium sulfur 
dioxide (Li-SO2) and lithium sulfuryl chloride (Li-SO2Cl2). 
 
The half-cell reactions, chemistry, and operating voltage details are provided below for the most 
commonly used lithium primary batteries. 
 
The half reactions for the Li-MnO2 cell chemistry are: 
 
Anode:   Li    Li+ + e- 
Cathode:  Mn
IV
O2 + Li
+
 + e
-
  MnIIIO2(Li
+
) 
The overall reaction is: Li + Mn
IV
O2    Mn
III
O2(Li
+
) 
The cathode is made up of solid heat treated MnO2, and the electrolyte is a mixture of propylene 
carbonate or butylene carbonate and dimethoxyethane, along with a salt such as lithium 
perchlorate or lithium trifluoroethylacetate (triflate).  The OCV of this cell chemistry is 3.3 V.  
The nominal or operating voltage of the cell is 3.0 V.  Caution should be exercised in using cells 
with an OCV greater than 3.3 V.  Higher voltages accelerate corrosion and lead to significant 
reduction in the calendar life of the battery. 
 
The half reactions for the Li CFx are: 
 
Anode:   xLi    xLi+ + xe- 
Cathode: (CF)x + xe
-
   xC + xF- 
The overall reaction is: xLi + (CF)x    xLiF + xC 
The cathode is solid polycarbon monofluoride, and the electrolyte is a mixture of gamma- 
butyrolactone with a salt such as lithium tetrafluoroborate.  In coin cells, dimethoxyethane is also 
added to the solvent mixture.  The OCV is 3.2 V, and the operating voltage is between 2.5 to 2.6 
V, which drops down further under higher loads.  Voltage delays are common with this 
chemistry, especially at low temperatures, and predischarge is typically performed to remove this 
feature. 
 
The half reactions for the LiFeS2 are: 
 
Anode:  4Li     4Li+ + 4e  
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Cathode:  FeS2 + 4e
 
   Fe + 2S2  
The overall reaction is: 4 Li + FeS2    Fe + 2Li2S 
The cathode is a solid iron disulfide (FeS2), and the electrolyte is a mixture of organic solvents 
such as dimethoxyethane and dioxolane and a salt such as lithium iodide.  The OCV of the cells 
is as high as 1.9 V, and its nominal voltage is 1.5 V.  The operating voltage range is from about 
1.6 V to 1.0 V, and the cells are capable of providing up to a C rate discharge.  
 
The half reactions for the Li-SOCl2 cell are: 
 
Anode: Li     Li+ + e- 
Cathode: 2SOCl2 + 2e
-   SO2 + S + 4Cl
-
 
The overall reaction is: 4Li + 2SOCl2   4LiCl + SO2 + S 
 
The catholyte is a mixture of thionyl chloride and lithium aluminum tetrachloride on high-
surface-area carbon.  The OCV is 3.7 V, and the nominal operating voltage for the former is 
3.5 V. 
 
The half reactions for the Li-BCX cell are: 
 
Anode: Li     Li+ + e- 
Cathode: 2SOCl2.BrCl + 2e
-   SO2 + S + 3Cl2
 
+ Br2 
The overall reaction is: 6Li + 2SOCl2.BrCl   4LiCl + SO2 + S + 2LiBr 
 
The catholyte in Li-BCX cells is a mixture of thionyl chloride (SOCl2), lithium aluminum 
tetrachloride, and bromine chloride (BrCl), with a SOCl2 to BrCl ratio of 6:1.  The OCV for  
Li-BCX is approximately 3.8 to 3.9 V, with an operating voltage of 3.6 V. 
 
6.6.2 Hazard Sources 
 
Lithium batteries have very high energy densities compared with other batteries, as shown by 
Table 6.6.2-1. 
 
Table 6.6.2-1.  Energy Density of Different Cell Chemistries (Manufacturer's Data) 
 Chemistry Watt-hr/lb Watt-hr/cu. in. 
 
Alkaline manganese D-cell 37 3.8 
Carbon-zinc D-cell 17 1.2 
Lithium-BCX D-cell 175 16.9 
Mercuric oxide D-cell 41 5.7 
Silver oxide-zinc rectangular cell 80 7.0 
 
Under unique and abusive conditions, lithium cells can be made to yield their contained energy 
suddenly and explosively.  Some of these conditions are: 
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a. Any condition that results in the lithium anode reaching its melting point of 180°C 
(356°F) is a hazardous condition.  Discharging lithium cells at a high rate produces heat; 
therefore, a lithium battery must be designed to safely remove that heat.  High 
temperatures can also be caused by an external heat source, an external short circuit, or 
physical abuse (e.g., crushing or penetration by a sharp object) that results in an internal 
short or a manufacturing defect resulting in an internal short. 
b. Discharging a cell until its voltage falls to 0 volts and then overdischarging the cell by 
forcing it into negative voltage, whether by cells in series with it or by another power 
supply, can result in cell rupture and/or explosion. 
c. Charging lithium cells can result in cell rupture and/or explosion.  Parallel combinations 
between cells, batteries, and power sources may force a charging current through a stack 
of cells containing a weak or dead cell.   
d. A toxicity hazard is presented by certain lithium cells that contain a pressure relief vent.  
Cell overpressurization under certain abuse conditions may release such toxic gases as 
sulfur dioxide, thionyl chloride, and/or hydrogen chloride, depending on the type of 
lithium battery, into the space vehicle environment.  Batteries with an electrolyte toxicity 
of level 4 should not be used in the habitable environment (irrespective of size) of a space 
vehicle.  Examples of such battery chemistries are lithium-sulfur dioxide, lithium-sulfuryl 
chloride, lithium-thionyl chloride, and Li-BCX.  
e. Internal shorts due to manufacturing defects and/or contamination. 
 
6.6.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. Lithium primary batteries should be failure tolerant to inadvertent charge, over-discharge 
into reversal, external shorts, and high temperatures.   
b. All primary lithium batteries greater than 300 mAh capacity should be tested for 
tolerance to internal shorts using simulated internal short tests (see internal shorts).   
Those that are intolerant to internal shorts (i.e., they exhibit leakage, venting, explosion, 
or fire) should undergo a higher vibration screening before flight. 
c. Lithium cell and battery temperatures should be controlled such that the temperature 
during operation remains below the manufacturer's stated upper temperature limit, for 
example, 71°C (159.8°F) for Li-BCX.  Testing should be done to verify safe performance 
at the operating temperature limits if the manufacturer’s recommended limits will be 
exceeded for any application.   
d. Thermal sensors, switches, or fuses set to open at the appropriate temperature should be 
installed in batteries containing lithium primary cells if the temperature of the battery is 
expected to exceed its safe rating.    
e. Both external and internal heat sources should be controlled in the battery design, as 
detailed in Section 5 on high temperatures. 
f. Overcurrent protection devices, such as fuses or circuit breakers, should be provided for 
lithium cells regardless of whether or not the cells have self-contained fuses.  Protective 
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devices should be rated above the highest likely load current but should have a low 
enough rating to prevent any form of external short circuit on the cell or battery.  See 
Section 4.5 for more details on short circuit protection. 
g. Wherever more than one lithium cell is used in series, each cell in the series string should 
have redundant parallel bypass diodes attached to them so that the diodes become 
conductive at the smallest possible negative voltage in order to provide over-discharge 
protection (see Figure 6.6.3-1).  Overcurrent devices, such as fuses or PTCs, should be in 
series to the cells to prevent bypass diode failures from causing external short hazards in 
the cells.  In selecting a shunt diode for the battery design, strive for the least negative 
value. 
h. Button cells with a capacity less than 300 mAh, which are used as backup power sources 
for computer memories, clocks, etc., may use a high-value resistor to limit a potential 
charging current. 
 
Figure 6.6.3-1.  Fuse and Diode Protection of a Cell 
 
i. If the battery design utilizes parallel strings of cells to obtain the desired current, each 
string should contain redundant blocking diodes in series with each string of cells.  
Batteries that are in parallel with external power sources should be equipped with charge-
current blocking devices (see Figure 6.6.3-2).  (The blocking diodes as shown below 
provide redundancy for both safety and mission success if a diode fails open or short-
circuited.  For just safety, only two blocking diodes in series are required.) 
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Figure 6.6.3-2.  Redundant Parallel Blocking Diodes for each Series String in a Parallel-Series 
Battery Combination 
 
j. Primary lithium button cells, such as Li-(CF)x, Li-iodine, Li-V2O5, and Li-MnO2, which 
have a capacity of 300 mAh or less and no more than three cells per common circuit, and 
cells that are not in a gas-tight compartment fall under the non-critical category and 
require the cell specification, UL test data, and the safety circuitry for review and 
approval on a EP-Form.  The cells should be acceptance-tested under vacuum conditions 
with weight checks, visual inspection, and open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage checks 
before and after the leak check. 
k. All other batteries that do not fall under the non-critical category should undergo 
engineering, qualification, and flight acceptance tests for each unique application.    
l. All flight batteries that do not fall under the non-critical category should undergo 
acceptance testing that includes visual inspection and testing for OCV, closed-circuit 
voltage, vibration to flight requirement levels or higher (Appendix A), and vacuum leak 
checks with weight and voltage measurements performed before and after each test.   
m. All inorganic electrolyte lithium primary cells should be verified to have undergone  
X-rays at the cell manufacturing facility. 
n. All the DFMR measures against cell internal shorts that are required for and mentioned in 
previous sections for lithium-ion (and that don’t involve cycling) should be applied to 
lithium primary batteries. 
  
6.6.4 Certification Requirement for Handling Lithium Batteries 
 
Personnel who handle lithium batteries or cells at JSC are required to be certified per the Center 
requirements under provisions of JPR 1700.1I, “JSC Safety and Health Handbook.”  A training 
class is offered through the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office at JSC.  After 
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successful completion of this class, personnel are certified for 12 months.  The class must be 
repeated every year to maintain certification.  Additional training in lithium battery handling is 
offered through the Energy Systems Test Area (ESTA).  The content of this training is provided 
in ESTA-OP-0-49 Rev E, “Lithium Battery Handler Certification.”  Although lithium primary 
batteries should be handled safely, they do not require to be classified by the quality standards 
(e.g., they need not be always treated as Class I or Class II hardware) unless they are flight or 
qualification units. 
 
6.6.5 Application of UL Data 
 
The UL conducts abuse tests on several models of lithium cells.  Cells that pass the abuse tests 
receive UL recognition (distinct from approval) by cell number.  The UL test data can be used as 
a reference during battery review to determine whether adequate hazard controls have been 
incorporated in a lithium battery design.  The use of UL safety test data  does not indicate that 
safety controls are not required. 
 
6.6.6 Prepackaged Multi-celled Batteries 
 
The use of prepackaged lithium batteries containing more than one cell should still contain the 
necessary hazard controls.  Modification of the prepackaged batteries may be required in order to 
incorporate the hazard controls into the final battery design. 
 
6.7 Nickel-Cadmium Batteries 
 
6.7.1 Definition 
 
While charging, nickel-cadmium cells produce a voltage with a gradually rising slope.  When the 
cells are fully charged, the voltage begins to increase its rate of rise and then drops off due to the 
inverse relationship of voltage and temperature in nickel-cadmium cells.  This peak in the 
voltage curve is readily detected, normally on the negative slope, and the chargers are designed 
to use this to terminate the charge.  Alternatively, nickel-cadmium battery charging may be 
terminated on the basis of an upward break in the temperature curve.   A timed cutoff is 
recommended as a backup for charge termination. 
 
The half reactions for the nickel-cadmium chemistry are: 
 
Anode:  Cd + 2OH
-
    Cd(OH)2 + 2e
-
  
Cathode:  NiO2 + 2H2O + 2e
-
   Ni(OH)2 + 2OH
-
 
The overall reaction is: Cd +NiO2 + 2H2O    Cd(OH)2 + Ni(OH)2  
 
The cathode in the nickel-cadmium cell is made up of nickel oxyhydroxide (NiOOH), and the 
anode is made up of cadmium hydroxide [Cd(OH)2].  The electrolyte is 45 percent by weight of 
KOH, which is approximately 6 M concentration.  The OCV of nickel-cadmium cells can be as 
high as 1.55 V, their nominal operating voltage is 1.2 V, and they are typically discharged down 
to 1.0 V per cell. 
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6.7.2 Hazards 
 
Since nickel-cadmium cells undergo both charge and discharge, the battery hazards detailed in 
subsections of Section 5 should be accounted for in the battery design, especially the hazards 
associated with gas generation, high temperature, and charging.  While nickel-cadmium cells are 
designed to recombine gases produced during nominal charging conditions, these battery types 
have pressure relief vents set at 200–300 psia. This vent is often a resealable type. There are 
welded seal aerospace-type nickel-cadmium cells without a vent, and these cells are generally 
used on open-frame designs. 
 
6.7.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. The controls detailed in the subsections of Section 5 should be incorporated for nickel-
cadmium batteries.   
b. The charge should be terminated by voltage slope and temperature sensing or by a rigid 
cutoff time with either voltage slope or temperature sensing.   
c. The charger should be tested under conditions representing the nominal operational 
mode, as well as under reasonable abuse scenarios (i.e., overcharge) for the intended 
application.  The tests should verify the successful operation of the charge termination 
method. 
d. Nickel-cadmium batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity fall under the non-critical 
category, and a Form 1230 for payloads is sufficient for documentation of the battery.   
e. Nickel-cadmium batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity should undergo 
acceptance testing that includes visual, functional, and vacuum leak checks.  For those 
that cannot be removed from the equipment, a functional check along with UL safety test 
data should be supplied.   
f. In all cases, the cell specification and the safety circuitry should be provided with the 
standardized hazard reports. 
g. COTS nickel-cadmium batteries of up to 20 V and 60 Wh for IVA use can be listed on 
the Form 1230, and the manufacturer’s specification, the battery protective features, and 
charger schematics should be provided to support two-fault tolerance to all catastrophic 
hazards. 
h. All other batteries that do not fall under Section ‘g’ should undergo engineering, 
qualification, and flight acceptance tests for each unique application.   
i. Lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells and batteries 
procured for the same application  
j. All flight nickel-cadmium cells and batteries that do not fall under ‘g’ should be from a 
single lot and should undergo open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage tests, vibration, and 
vacuum tests, with functional charge/discharge cycles performed before and after each 
test.  
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6.8 Nickel-Hydrogen Batteries 
 
6.8.1  Definition 
 
Nickel-hydrogen batteries utilize essentially the same positive electrode and electrolyte as 
nickel-cadmium cells and a platinum catalyst negative electrode.  This battery does not suffer a 
fate similar to other nickel-based cells if overcharged or if over-discharged into reversal.  Nickel-
hydrogen batteries exhibit maximum performance between –10°C and 0°C with performance 
dropping off sharply above 30°C.  Operational life exceeding 60,000 low Earth orbit (LEO) 
cycles and more than 15 years of geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) cycling has been obtained 
in satellite use.  The expense of this battery generally dictates its use. 
 
The half reactions for the NiH2 are:  
 
Anode: 1/2 H2 + OH
-
    H2O + e
-
  
Cathode:  NiOOH + H2O + e
-
   Ni(OH)2 + OH
-
   
The overall reaction is: NiOOH + 1/2 H2    Ni(OH)2   
The anode in NiH2 cells is the hydrogen electrode, which is hydrogen gas in a compressed state 
and a Teflon bonded platinum black catalyst that is supported on a photo-etched nickel substrate. 
The cathode is similar to the other nickel chemistries and is composed of nickel hydroxide 
impregnated on a porous nickel sintered plaque.  The electrolyte is concentrated KOH, but it 
varies in concentration depending on the application.  The concentration of KOH in a fully 
discharged cell used for LEO applications ranges from 26 to 31 percent, and from 31 to  
38 percent in those used for GEO applications.  The nominal voltage for this battery chemistry is  
1.2 V. 
 
6.8.2  Hazard Sources 
 
The principal hazard associated with nickel-hydrogen batteries is the high-pressure hydrogen in 
fully charged cells, 800–1,000 psia.  Internal pressure is directly proportional to the relative 
SOC.  These cells are welded seal, leak-before-burst designs without relief valves and can 
typically found in open-frame battery designs. 
 
6.8.3  Controls/Process Requirements 
 
The nickel-hydrogen cell container is considered a thin-walled pressure vessel and should be 
designed and certified to leak before burst to ensure that breaching the container does not result 
in release of shrapnel.  Special arrangements need to be made well in advance of launch of any 
nickel-hydrogen battery that will require crew handling.  See Section 5.1.1.1 for requirements for 
pressure vessels.  
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6.9 Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries 
 
6.9.1 Definition 
 
Nickel-metal hydride cells became commercially available in the early 1990’s as replacements 
for nickel-cadmium cells.  In part this was sparked by new limits on the allowable cadmium in 
the manufacturing work place.  Nickel-metal hydride cells typically provide up to twice the 
capacity for the same size nickel-cadmium cell and experience less of the "memory effect" 
characteristic of nickel-cadmium cells.  The voltage and discharge parameters of both 
chemistries are sufficiently similar to allow the interchange of nickel-cadmium and nickel-metal 
hydride cells for discharge purposes.  However, the intricacies of the charge characteristics of 
nickel-metal hydride cells differ enough from the nickel-cadmium cells that nickel-cadmium 
chargers cannot be safely used to charge nickel-metal hydride cells in the habitable environment 
of a spacecraft. 
 
The half reactions for the nickel-metal hydride are: 
 
Anode: MH + OH
-
   M + H2O + e
-
 (M = metal alloy)  
Cathode:  NiOOH + H2O + e
-
    Ni(OH)2 + OH
-
   
The overall reaction is: NiOOH + MH    Ni(OH)2 + M  
 
The cathode is nickel oxyhydroxide, and the anode is typically one of two types of metallic 
alloys.  One such alloy is the Misch metal type that is made up of rare earth alloys of lanthanum 
nickel (LaNi5) known as the AB5 class, and another is made up of titanium and zirconium known 
as the AB2 class.  Substitutions of the Misch metal alloys can be made with Ce, Nd, Pr, Gd, and 
Y in the place of La.  In the case of AB2 types, major substitutions by the use of V, Ti, and Zr 
provide improved hydrogen storage.  Other metal substitutions are made in both cases to 
suppress corrosion that would result in longer life.  The electrolyte is typically 30 percent by 
weight of KOH.  The OCV for the nickel-metal hydride is similar to the nickel-cadmium and is 
approximately 1.55 to 1.6 V.  The nominal or operating voltage of the cell is 1.2 V, and the cell 
is discharged down to 1.0 V. 
 
Nickel-metal hydride cells exhibit a gradually rising slope to the discharge curve while charging.   
However, the negative slope at completion of charge is not as significant as with nickel-cadmium 
cells.  The negative slope may go undetected, especially at the lower charge rates, forcing the 
cells into overcharge.  For this reason, chargers designed strictly for nickel-cadmium batteries 
cannot be used to charge nickel-metal hydride cells and/or batteries.  The nickel-metal hydride 
charger should be designed to terminate the charge on a characteristic other than the negative 
voltage slope in addition to the negative voltage slope.  Chargers designed specifically for 
nickel-metal hydride cells often terminate charge when the voltage changeover time is zero.  
Alternatively, the charge is terminated on the basis of an upward break in the temperature curve.  
A timed cutoff is recommended as a backup for charge termination. 
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6.9.2 Hazards 
 
Since nickel-metal hydride cells undergo both charge and discharge, the battery hazards detailed 
in subsections of Section 5 should be accounted for in the battery design, especially the hazards 
associated with gas generation, high temperature, and charging.  While both are designed to 
recombine gases produced during nominal charging conditions, these battery types have pressure 
relief vents set at 200–300 psia.  This vent is often a resealable type. 
 
6.9.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. The controls detailed in the subsections of Section 5 should be incorporated for nickel-
metal hydride batteries.   
b. The charge should be terminated by voltage slope and temperature sensing or by a rigid 
cutoff time with either voltage slope or temperature sensing.  
c.  The charger should be tested under conditions representing the nominal operational 
mode as well as under reasonable abuse scenarios (i.e., overcharge) for the intended 
application.  The tests should verify the successful operation of the charge termination 
method.  An example of acceptance and lot testing of cells is provided in EP-WI-014 B. 
d. Nickel-metal hydride batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity fall under the non-
critical category, and a Form 1230 is sufficient for documentation of the battery for 
payloads.   
e. Nickel-metal hydride batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity should undergo 
acceptance testing that includes functional and vacuum leak checks.   
f. For nickel-metal hydride batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity that cannot be 
removed from the equipment, a functional check along with UL safety test data should be 
supplied. 
g. In all cases, the cell specification and the safety circuitry should be provided with the 
standardized hazard reports. 
h. COTS nickel-metal hydride batteries of up to 20 V and 60 Wh for IVA use can be listed 
on the Form 1230, and the manufacturer’s specification, the battery protective features, 
and charger schematics should be provided to support two-fault tolerance to all 
catastrophic hazards. 
i. All other batteries that do not fall under the Section ‘h’ should undergo engineering, 
qualification, and flight acceptance tests for each unique application.   
j. Lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells and batteries 
procured for the same application. 
k. All flight nickel-metal hydride cells and batteries that do not fall under ‘g’ should be 
from a single lot and should undergo open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage tests, with 
vibration and vacuum tests with functional charge/discharge cycles performed before and 
after each test. 
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6.10 Silver-Zinc Batteries 
 
6.10.1 Definition 
 
Although silver-zinc batteries have limited cycle life, they are frequently used because of their 
high energy density, for example, in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU).  
 
The half reactions are: 
 
Anode: Zn       Zn2+ + 2e
-
   
 Zn
2+
 + 2OH
-
   Zn(OH)2    
Cathode: 2AgO + H2O + 2e
-
   Ag2O + 2OH
- 
 
  Ag2O + 2H2O + 2e
-  2Ag + 2OH-  
The overall reaction is: Ag2O + Zn + H2O    Zn(OH)2
 
+ Ag  
The anode is a zinc electrode supported by a silver or copper current collector.  The cathode is 
silver oxide on a silver grid that serves as the current collector.  Silver is in its pure metallic form 
during discharge and is converted to silver (II) oxide (AgO) at the end of full charge.  An 
intermediate product that is formed is silver (I) oxide or monovalent silver oxide (Ag2O).  The 
electrolyte is KOH with an optimum concentration of 45 percent, which is corrosive and can 
cause burns on the skin and damage to equipment.  The OCV for a silver-zinc cell is typically 
1.86 V at room temperature. 
 
6.10.2 Hazard Sources 
 
The main safety concern is electrolyte leakage.  It should be noted that if it is necessary to top off 
the electrolyte, one should add only electrolyte and not water, as water alone will lead to 
degradation of the cell separator. 
 
6.10.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. The controls associated with electrolyte leakage, as discussed in subsections of Section 5, 
apply.   
b. Cells with free electrolyte and that generate gases even while at open circuit, such as in 
silver-zinc, should be designed with a relief valve in line with the vent port with liquid 
absorbent material to allow "burping" of gases but to trap liquid electrolyte, especially 
during the atmospheric pressure changes, which occur with launch and reentry.  
c. Battery cases, such as those for silver-zinc batteries, should have redundant pressure 
relief valves.  The relief valve on the cell itself can be used as one level of control, 
wherever applicable. 
d. Cell vents in silver-zinc cells should be made out of noncorrosive or corrosion-resistant 
materials.  A cell vent made of metallic materials could possibly contribute to the 
formation of shorting paths.  In addition, corroded vents can easily plug up, contributing 
to an energetic release of gases and electrolyte. 
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e. For silver-zinc batteries that have a relatively low pressure relief valve, whenever 
possible during prelaunch stowage, the batteries should be oriented "upright" relative to 
the launch gravity-vector so that any free electrolyte will be forced by the earth's gravity 
and the launch acceleration into the cell away from cell seals or vents.   
f. Silver-zinc batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity fall under the non-critical 
category, and a Form 1230 for payloads is sufficient for documentation of the battery.   
g. Silver-zinc batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity should undergo acceptance 
testing that includes visual, functional, and vacuum leak checks.   
h. For those silver-zinc batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity that cannot be 
removed from the equipment, a functional check along with UL safety test data  should 
be supplied.   
i. In all cases, the cell specification and the safety circuitry should be provided with the 
standardized hazard reports. 
j. For those batteries that have capacities above 300 mAh and that are rechargeable, 
acceptance test cycles should be performed on the flight batteries.   
k. COTS silver-zinc batteries of up to 20 V and 60 Wh for IVA use can be listed on Form 
1230, and the manufacturer’s specification, the battery protective features, and charger 
schematics should be provided to support two-fault tolerance to all catastrophic hazards. 
l. All other batteries that do not fall under ‘h’ should undergo engineering, qualification, 
and flight acceptance tests for each unique application.   
m. Lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells and batteries 
procured for the same application.  
n. All flight silver-zinc cells and batteries that do not fall under ‘g’ should be from a single 
lot and should undergo open circuit and closed circuit voltage tests, with vibration and 
vacuum tests with functional charge/discharge cycles performed before and after each 
test. 
   
6.11 Zinc-Air Batteries 
 
6.11.1 Definition 
 
Zinc-air batteries have a high energy density since the bulk of the cell contains only one of the 
reactants: zinc.  Oxygen from the air is required to complete the chemical reaction that produces 
voltage from a zinc-air cell.  The zinc-air battery should therefore contain air holes to let oxygen 
in, yet should also be sealed to prevent the leakage of electrolyte.  Using gas permeable, liquid 
impermeable material to cover the air holes makes this possible.  To prevent voltage loss during 
storage due to self-discharge reactions, the battery design should include an air barrier over the 
air holes (i.e., battery inside a bag or gas impermeable material placed over the air holes).  
Removal of the air barrier when the battery is to be used will activate the cells by allowing air 
into the cell reactions.  In addition to these guidelines for zinc-air batteries, the following hazards 
must also be considered.  
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6.11.2 Hazard Sources 
 
a. Hydrogen gas is generated by the chemical reaction between the KOH electrolyte and the 
zinc anode.  The hydrogen generation rate is 0.01 cc hydrogen/hr/gram of zinc for 0.5 
percent mercury amalgamated zinc at 21.1°C (70°F), based on silver-zinc chemistry.  The 
hydrogen generation rate doubles or halves with each 10°C increase or decrease, 
respectively, in temperature (corresponding to a doubling or halving for every 18°F 
increase or decrease).  The discharge rate also affects the rate of hydrogen generation. 
b. Zinc-air cells and battery cases require air holes in order to provide an access port for 
oxygen, a necessary reactant of the chemical reaction, which produces current.  The air 
holes are a potential leak point for the KOH electrolyte.  KOH is a strong base that can be 
caustic to eyes, mucous membranes, and skin and corrosive to most metals.  In addition 
to the air holes, another potential leak point is the gasket between the two parts of the cell 
can.  Also, charging zinc-air primary cells may cause cells to rupture, releasing the 
electrolyte. 
c. Other causes for hazards for zinc-air cells include short circuits, circulating currents, high 
temperature, and charging.  The details of these hazards are contained in their respective 
subsections of Section 5. 
 
6.11.3 Controls/Process Requirements 
 
a. Accumulation of generated hydrogen gas should be minimized by providing vents in the 
battery.  The air holes, which bring oxygen to the cells, can also serve as vent holes for 
generated hydrogen.   
 
b. If a ventilated zinc-air battery is installed inside another container, the second container 
should also have a relief vent for hydrogen. 
 
c. The air holes in zinc-air should be covered with a material, such as Gore-Tex® fabric, 
which is permeable to air but impermeable to the electrolyte.   
 
d. The battery case, potting material, and case sealants should be made of materials that are 
compatible with the strong base potassium hydroxide electrolyte. 
 
e. The zinc-air battery design should have controls for short circuits, circulating currents, 
high temperature, and charge prevention as detailed in their respective subsections of 
Section 4.0. 
 
f. Zinc-air batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity fall under the non-critical category, 
and a Form 1230 for payloads is sufficient for documentation of the battery.   
 
g. Zinc-air batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity should undergo acceptance testing 
that includes visual, functional, and vacuum leak checks.   
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h. For those zinc-air batteries and cells of up to 300 mAh capacity that cannot be removed 
from the equipment, a functional check along with UL safety test data  should be 
supplied. 
  
6.12 Lithium-Sulfur 
 
6.12.1  Definition 
 
Lithium-sulfur (Li-S) is a rechargeable battery chemistry that has been researched and improved 
in the past decade.  Although the theoretical energy density of this battery chemistry is at  
2,500 Wh/kg, the practical energy density at 400 Wh/kg is still the highest achievable for any 
rechargeable battery chemistry.  This type of battery chemistry would offer tremendous savings 
in mass.  However, due to the decomposition products formed during the charge/discharge 
process, the cycle life of this chemistry at this time is extremely limited.  The half-reactions for 
the lithium-sulfur chemistry are the following: 
 
Anode:   S8 → Li2S8 → Li2S6 → Li2S4 → Li2S3 
Cathode:   Li2S → Li2S2 → Li2S3 → Li2S4 → Li2S6 → Li2S8 → S8 
 
The anode of the lithium-sulfur cell is made up of lithium metal, and the cathode is liquid sulfur.  
The electrolyte is made up of dioxolane and a salt such as bis(trifluoromethane sulfonimide).  
The cell is initially made up of a solid sulfur cathode. which goes into solution when charged.  At 
the anode, lithium is dissolved during discharge and plates out on the anode during charge.  The 
sulfur (S8) cathode combines with lithium to form Li2S8, Li2S6, Li2S3, Li2S2, and Li2S.  The 
higher polysulfides, such as Li2S8, are present at the higher states of charge.  The lower 
polysulfides, such as Li2S, are present at the lower states of charge.  The operating voltage range 
for the lithium-sulfur cell is between 2.5 to 1.7 V. 
 
6.12.2 Hazards 
 
The hazards associated with lithium-sulfur cells are similar to most other lithium-based 
rechargeable battery chemistries.  Under abuse conditions such as overcharge and external short, 
due to the presence of a flammable electrolyte and lithium metal the cells can vent and burn until 
all the electrolyte and active material has been consumed.   
 
6.12.3  Controls 
 
a. Lithium-sulfur cells should be two-fault tolerant to overcharge, over-discharge into 
reversal, external short, and high temperatures. 
b. Lithium-sulfur cells should be screened for internal shorts using the vibration method. 
c. All lithium-sulfur batteries should undergo engineering, qualification, and flight 
acceptance tests for each unique application.   
d. Qualification testing should include vibration to a higher level as for cells intolerant to 
internal shorts.  
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e. Lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells and batteries 
procured for the same application.  
f. All flight lithium-sulfur cells and batteries should be from a single lot and should undergo 
open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage tests, vibration to a higher level for cells intolerant 
to internal shorts, and vacuum tests with functional charge/discharge cycles performed 
before and after each test. 
g. All lithium-sulfur cells should be transported in a discharged state. 
h. All lithium-sulfur cells should be transported in metallic shipping containers and packed 
with noncombustible materials.  They should be individually bagged in plastic bags to 
prevent any short circuits. 
i. All lithium-sulfur cells should be visually inspected before removing from shipping 
containers. 
j. Lithium-sulfur cells that are warm to the touch should be allowed to cool to room 
temperature.  If the cells do not cool down, they should be placed in mineral oil to 
neutralize the active materials in the cell. 
k. Lithium-sulfur cells should always be stored at temperatures between 0 and 30°C. 
l. Lithium-sulfur cells should be discharged in the temperature range of –20 to 45°C. 
m. A lithium-sulfur cell fire should be extinguished by smothering with copper powder or 
with a Lith-X fire extinguisher and should not be disturbed for a minimum of 24 hours. 
 
6.13  Thermal Batteries 
 
6.13.1  Definition 
 
Thermal batteries are a form of reserve batteries and are used extensively in applications that 
require an indefinite stand time and long life.  They are used in mines, missiles, nuclear weapons, 
etc., where they have to perform on demand.  They are used in applications that require an 
extremely reliable battery that can withstand extreme environmental stresses such as shock and 
spin.  The battery, once activated, performs at a very high rate for a very short time, typically on 
the order of a few minutes.  The batteries are activated by using a current pulse or by laser 
activation methods.  The most commonly used thermal battery is of the lithium iron disulfide 
type, which has lithium as the anode and iron disulfide as the cathode.  The electrolyte is a 
combination of lithium chloride, potassium chloride, and magnesium oxide.   
 
Although the basic unit of the battery chemistry is about 1.5 V, thermal batteries are made with 
the appropriate stacks of electrodes to provide the voltage desired.  The diameter and thickness 
of the electrodes determines the capacity of the battery, and the capacity is typically provided by 
the discharge life time rather than in ampere-hours.  Hence, thermal batteries of different 
voltages as well as capacities can be manufactured.   
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6.13.2  Hazards 
 
The hazards associated with thermal batteries are due to the high energies that can be released 
within very short periods.  Hazards are associated with inadvertent charge, over-discharge into 
reversal, external short circuits, crush, high temperatures during storage, as well as inadvertent 
activation of the batteries.   
 
6.13.3 Controls 
 
a. Thermal batteries should be failure tolerant to inadvertent charge, over-discharge into 
reversal, external short circuit, and high temperatures. 
b. Thermal batteries should be X-rayed to eliminate the presence of metallic or activate 
material particles in the cell stack. 
c. The welded seal of the thermal batteries should be maintained after exposure of the 
battery to 90 psig for one hour at room temperature. 
d. The voltage of the batteries when measured for less than 30 seconds prior to initiation 
should not exceed 3 mV.  The measurement should be taken with an instrument with a 
minimum of 6 MOhm input resistance and less than 100 picofarads of input capacitance. 
e. The insulation resistance of the battery when measured using 100 +/– 5 Vdc, prior to 
initiation, between the terminal and case or between the initiator terminal and either the 
positive or negative or between the positive and negative terminals should be greater than 
20 MOhms.  Caution should be exercised during this test to avoid measurements between 
the two initiator terminals, as this would cause inadvertent activation of the battery. 
f. Flight acceptance testing should include tests from “c” to “e” on all flight batteries, as 
well as vibration to higher than typical levels for those intolerant to internal shorts. 
 
6.14   Capacitors/Supercapacitors 
 
Traditional capacitors and supercapacitors are used in several applications as alternate energy 
sources (in the place of or in conjunction with batteries) for space use.  Capacitors do not have 
the same hazards as batteries, but with the advancement in capacitor technology and the 
invention of asymmetric as well as lithium-ion supercapacitors, the hazards associated with the 
use of capacitors as alternate energy sources may not remain the same as those of EEE parts, 
especially when used in a human-rated space environment. 
 
For traditional capacitors and supercapacitors used as alternate energy sources, a destructive 
analysis should be carried out to determine if any excess electrolyte is present.  In the absence of 
excess electrolyte and if the toxicological assessment indicates a toxicity rating lower than 2, 
then only open-circuit voltage measurements need to be recorded on flight units and requires 
documentation.  In the presence of excess electrolyte (electrolyte droplets visually observed or 
obtained by centrifuging or squeezing electrodes) or if the toxicity rating is 2 or higher, then a 
safety assessment similar to that of batteries should be carried out. 
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Asymmetric capacitors should undergo an assessment similar to that of batteries and depending 
on the chemistry, the relevant battery chemistry requirements and processes should be used.   For 
example, lithium-ion supercapacitors should be treated in a manner similar to lithium-ion 
batteries. 
 
Capacitors that are used in a non-“alternate energy source” application as standard circuit-board-
level components (example “EEE part” applications) and that are non-electrolytic, do not contain 
free/excess electrolyte, and are not of the asymmetric or lithium-ion type are not subject to the 
guidelines recommended herein.  Documentation of the safety of these components are verified 
via nominal hardware testing and acceptance processes used for EEE parts. 
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APPENDIX A: QUALIFICATION AND FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE 
VIBRATION TESTING (AVT) FOR BATTERIES 
 
Flight Cell and Battery Pack Qualification Testing 
 
The qualification testing should be conducted at the cell level and the battery level (i.e., on the 
standalone battery), as well as at the integrated, top-level assembly (i.e., with the cells or battery 
pack installed in the top-level assembly).  Determination of the qualification and certification test 
plan is achieved via inputs from the battery evaluation process, the intended application, and the 
program (i.e., shuttle or station) requirements.  Typical testing includes functional checkout  
(i.e., operational, cycle), environmental (i.e., vibration, thermal, thermal vacuum), 
electromagnetic compatibility, power quality, or others as deemed appropriate for the specific 
hardware and application.  The vibration spectrum varies depending on the cell chemistry and 
tolerance of the cell to internal shorts.  The safety tests that are required to prove two-fault 
tolerance to catastrophic hazard should be performed as part of a qualification test program and 
repeated for each newly purchased lot of the same battery.  The flight cell and battery packs that 
form the flight lot can go into the flight acceptance testing after the qualification test has been 
successfully completed. 
 
A.1 Qualification Vibration Testing (QVT) for Batteries Tolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the QVT for those batteries that are tolerant to internal shorts is to demonstrate 
the ability of the component to withstand the stresses and accumulated fatigue damage resulting 
from the maximum random vibration environment.  The test duration in each of the three 
orthogonal axes should be equivalent to either the total AVT time the battery will experience or  
5 minutes, whichever is greater.  The test levels and spectrum are shown in Figure A-1 and  
Table A-1. 
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Figure A-1.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries and Cells Tolerant to  
Internal Shorts 
 
Table A-1.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries and Cells  
Tolerant to Internal Shorts 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.025000 * *
80.00 0.100000 3.01 1.94
350.00 0.100000 0.00 5.55
2000.00 0.017500 -3.01 9.58  
 
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-1 and 
Table A-1.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the power 
spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this document should 
be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
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A.2   QVT for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the QVT for those batteries that are “intolerant” or “not tolerant” to internal 
shorts is to demonstrate the ability of the component to withstand the stresses and accumulated 
fatigue damage resulting from the maximum random vibration environment and to identify any 
potential internal short hazard.  The test duration in each of the three orthogonal axes should be 
equivalent to either the total AVT time the battery will experience or 5 minutes, whichever is 
greater.   
 
 
Figure A-2.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
Table A-2.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.057600 * *
40.00 0.057600 0.00 1.07
70.00 0.144000 4.93 2.02
700.00 0.144000 0.00 9.74
2000.00 0.037440 -3.86 13.65  
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-2 and 
Table A-2.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the power 
spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this document should 
be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
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A.3 Flight Cell and Battery Pack Verification Acceptance Testing 
 
The type of acceptance testing required for different battery chemistries is listed in Table A-3 for 
flight batteries.  Note that omission of any cell chemistry from the table does not mean it cannot 
be used.  Cell chemistries not listed in the table can be used with sufficient hazard control 
verification to warrant battery approval.  Off-gassing/out-gassing tests may be required for 
materials compatibility.  Data from the cell and battery pack screening must be recorded and 
included as part of the acceptance data package.  JSC 25159, “Toxicological Hazard 
Assessments on Batteries Used in Space Shuttle Missions,” is to be used to determine the 
toxicity of batteries based on their generic chemistry classification.   
 
Table A-3 provides a guideline for the types of acceptance tests that are required to be 
performed, and a categorical rating for each chemistry is included to offer design guidance.  
Table A-4 provides a categorical description of batteries based on cell chemistries and their 
associated amounts of hazard controls.  The test levels required must be based on the mission to 
be performed and the environments expected for the battery.  Consultation with the respective 
NASA Power Systems Office must be conducted to verify that the test levels are adequate.  For 
chemistries not listed in the table, the respective NASA Power Systems Office can be consulted.   
Table A-3.  Flight Acceptance Tests for Cells or Battery Packs 
Battery Cell 
Chemistry 
Battery Category 
See Table 
3.5-2  for 
descriptions 
Conducted on 100% of Flight Cells 
Visual 
Inspection 
Dimension Weight OCV 
 
CCV Vacuum/
Leak 
 
Vibration Cycle 
Testin
g 
Thermal 
Cycle 
(EVA Only) 
Alkaline 1, 2  M  M M  M  M  M N/A N/A M 
Zn-air 1, 2  M  M  M  M  M  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Li iodine 1, 2  M  M  M  M  M M N/A N/A M 
LiCFx 1, 2  M  M  M  M  M M N/A N/A M 
LiFeS2 1, 2  M  M  M  M  M M M N/A M 
AgZn 1 - 3  M  M  M  M  M M M  M(s) M 
Li-MnO2 1 - 3  M  M  M  M  M M M N/A M 
NiCd 1 - 3  M  M  M  M M M M M M 
NiMH 1 - 3  M  M  M M M M M M M 
Pb Acid 2-4  M M   M  M M M M M M 
Li-BCX 4  M M M M M M M N/A M 
Li-ion/ 
Li-ion 
polymer 3 M M M M M M M M M 
Li-SOCl2 4 M M M M M M M N/A M 
NiH2 3  M M M M M M M M M 
Li-SO2 4 M M M M M M M N/A M 
M = Mandatory for cells (if loose cell application) and battery packs (if battery pack application) for 
screening (workmanship or internal short depending on the chemistry). 
(s)= For secondary (rechargeable) cells and batteries. 
 
Table A-4.  Categorical Descriptions for Batteries 
Category Description 
1 Small Commonly Used Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) battery cells that can be used for flight 
with minimal testing/documentation required. 
 Examples:  Batteries/Cells covered in the Form 1230. 
2 COTS cells available to the public requiring additional testing/documentation 
 Examples:  Battery/Cell chemistries covered on the form 1230 but of a larger capacity or higher 
   complexity.  Sealed Lead Acid (SLA), Li-SOCl2 button cells. 
3 Cells available for Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) assembly as a pack, but not readily 
available to the general public as loose cells. 
   Exemples: Li-ion, Ni-H2  
4 Cells and batteries of any size that cannot be used, stored, or transported in a habitable volume  
 Examples:  Li-SO2, sodium sulfur, Li-SOCl2, Li-BCX, Li-SO2Cl2. 
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A.4 AVT for Batteries Tolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the AVT for those batteries tolerant to internal shorts is to detect material and 
workmanship flaws prior to flight by subjecting the battery to a dynamic vibration environment.  
The test duration in each of the three orthogonal axes should be no less than 1 minute.  The test 
levels and spectrum are shown in Figure A-3 and Table A-5. 
 
 
Figure A-3.  Flight Acceptance Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Tolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
Table A-5.  Flight Acceptance Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Tolerant to  
Internal Shorts 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.010000 * *
80.00 0.040000 3.01 1.22
350.00 0.040000 0.00 3.51
2000.00 0.007000 -3.01 6.06  
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-3 and 
Table A-5.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the power 
spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this document should 
be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
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A.5 AVT for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the AVT for those batteries that are intolerant to internal shorts is to detect 
material and workmanship flaws prior to flight by subjecting the battery to a dynamic vibration 
environment and to identify any potential internal short hazard.  The test duration in each of the 
three orthogonal axes should be no less than 1 minute.   
 
 
Figure A-4.  Flight Acceptance Screening Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal 
Shorts 
 
Table A-6.  Flight Acceptance Screening Vibration Spectrum for Batteries  
Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.028800 * *
40.00 0.028800 0.00 0.76
70.00 0.072000 4.93 1.43
700.00 0.072000 0.00 6.89
2000.00 0.018720 -3.86 9.65  
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-4 and 
Table A-6.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the power 
spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this document should 
be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
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APPENDIX B: CUSTOM CELL MANUFACTURING FACILITY AUDITS 
 
The manufacturer’s cell production line used for making the flight cells should be audited to 
determine the following.   
 Cell production control documentation.  The production control document should define 
the procedure for defining impurities and the material specifications and inspections.  
Stringent configuration control should be implemented.  It is advised that an independent 
analysis of incoming raw materials be carried out. 
 Quality control documents, material specifications with impurity level specifications, 
incoming goods inspection documentation, supplier batch impurity analysis 
documentation, and periodic third-party audits of the supplier’s certificates of analyses  
for, at a minimum, the components of the active electrode materials, electrolyte (or 
components of the electrolyte), separator, insulators, and any safety components. 
 The audit should confirm that the manufacturer is adhering to approved definition of cell 
lots.  
 Configuration control process.  This is essential when a particular project would not be 
able to accept changes to the baseline cell design due to the nature and criticality of the 
application.  Configuration control is applicable to custom cell designs and should be 
achieved with documentation that enables traceability to all tools, fixtures, machines, 
instruments, settings, environmental conditions, contaminant control, and pass/fail 
criteria for the production of a unique cell design.  Configuration control can also be 
defined as documentation that demonstrates a solid chain of custody from incoming 
materials to final assembly and vice versa.  
 Particulate and contaminant control documents and inspection of processes, and the 
methods used to minimize contaminants.  These environmental audits should verify that 
magnets, adhesive tapes, and vacuum extraction are employed along with documentation 
of particle count and equipment calibration.  The manufacturer’s procedure for collection 
of loose material produced during the production process should be audited.  Metal-on-
metal contact and other sources of contamination should be minimized near cell 
production processes up through cell closure.  Examples of expected housekeeping 
measures to prevent contamination include dedicated or disposable footwear, hair caps, 
and lab coats, along with disposable gloves for all personnel in cell production areas up 
through cell closure.  In addition, air pressure, as used in air knifes and air showers, is an 
effective alternative method to control mobile contaminants.  It is important to control all 
contaminants in the vicinity of electrode manufacturing process before they become 
embedded into the electrode coatings, as visual inspection of final product will not 
identify embedded contaminants if these processes are not followed.  Manufacturers 
should implement effective contamination control procedures for critical operations.  A 
DPA is a means of demonstrating effective contamination control. 
 The audit should objectively verify the effectiveness of contaminant mitigation measures 
for each process, through methods such as magnetic sampling.  The contaminants 
collected should be examined by various methods (optical, Scanning Electron 
Microscopy/ Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy).  
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 Design documents for the cells, analysis records for actual manufactured cells, and action 
reports for any cells not meeting specification are all part of the configuration control 
process.   
 The burr control process, to include burr measurement equipment, calibration certificates, 
burr definition, cutting tool change procedures, and machine maintenance procedures and 
records, etc.  Sample testing for burr control shall be witnessed; no burrs should be 
present in any of the cell components.  
 Electrode manufacturing process, including visual inspection of production line, testing 
carried out on line, testing of coating adherence, defect identification and classification, 
procedure for electrode extraction, electrode inspection procedure for uniform coating, 
defective electrode identification, examples of defective electrodes, electrode scrapping 
process, damaged electrode disposal, checking of manufacturing machines for cause of 
electrode defects, and detection of nonconforming cell cores. 
 Tension of the electrode winding process to confirm that this process is characterized, 
optimized, and controlled; inspection of cell assembly specification or confirmation that 
the cell core assembly processes have been characterized, optimized, and controlled to 
prevent damage to the cell core. 
 Cell assembly process, including the assembly of insulating materials, electrode 
alignment, positive and negative tab placement characterization, inspection of positioning 
of insulating plates, integrity of cell core assembly check using resistance/continuity 
tests, and equipment calibration for the equipment used for testing; X-rays of 100 percent 
of the cells to look for electrode alignment at the top and bottom of cells; and review of 
pass/fail criteria for X-ray inspection. 
 Cell aging and validation of aging process, including grading and sorting. 
 Cell screening process for removal of leaking cells and documentation of leaked cells. 
 Other processes, such as welding, are characterized and tested and have proper 
documentation. 
 Qualification process for new cell designs and qualification process of production cells. 
 Determine whether the vendor’s quality system meets the requirements of ISO 9001. 
 
Audits should be pre-coordinated with the manufacturer to allow for a thorough examination of 
the manufacturing facility during a production process.  The audit should enable the audit team 
to see all processes used by the production line for making the cell designs for a specific flight 
program while cells are being manufactured.  Witnessing of cell production used for the 
engineering evaluation and/or qualification phases of a flight program is recommended to allow 
the manufacturer to respond to any findings/observations compiled by the audit.  During the 
audit, the auditors should observe all cell manufacturing processes, from incoming inspection of 
materials to cell formation, cell closure, and testing.  At the end of the audit, the auditing team 
will analyze the list of findings and observations and resolve this with the entire team, including 
the cell manufacturer, before full production of the flight cell design is initiated.  Acceptable cell 
manufacturing processes for crewed spacecraft batteries are those with processes that are 
consistent with those that achieve less than 1 ppm catastrophic cell internal short circuit failure 
rates.   
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APPENDIX C: SHELF AND SERVICE LIFE FOR VARIOUS 
CELL/BATTERY CHEMISTRIES 
 
Batteries and cells have both shelf (or calendar) life and service life.  For simplicity, single cells 
and multi-cell packs will be described as batteries.  Both parameters are dependent on the battery 
chemistry.  Both parameters should be specified while obtaining safety certification for the cells 
and batteries used for each unique application.  The shelf life and service life vary depending on 
whether the batteries are primary (nonrechargeable) or secondary (rechargeable).   
 
The shelf or calendar life is described as the life of the battery wherein its components (internal 
and external) have been, historically and by test, proven to be stable and safe.  This is provided 
by the cell or battery manufacturer.  The shelf life of batteries is affected by factors such as 
environment and usage.  Usage in environments beyond the manufacturer’s recommendation can 
cause irreversible damage to the batteries, lowering their shelf life.  Table C-1 provides the shelf 
life for the various chemistries.   The shelf life of primary batteries should not be extended, as the 
components of the cell are manufactured to meet only the manufacturer’s stated shelf life.  For 
rechargeable batteries, this shelf life can be extended by carrying out cycle life testing, as this 
data will provide adequate evidence of the robustness of the cell components.  This testing 
includes performing at least five charge and discharge cycles.  If at least 90 percent of the 
required performance is obtained from the batteries, the life of the battery can be extended for  
2 years, and if at least 80 percent of the required performance is obtained, then the life can be 
extended for 1 year.  At the end of this period, testing can be repeated to extend the life again, 
until the battery is incapable of meeting the minimum performance requirements levied by the 
project. 
Table C-1.  Shelf life of Commonly Used Cell/Battery Chemistries 
Chemistry Shelf life 
Li-BCX, Li-SOCl2, Li-SO2Cl2, 
Li-SO2, Li-MnO2, LiCFx 
10 years 
Li-FeS2 15 years 
Alkaline 8 years (in freezer storage); 3 
years at ambient 
Ag-Zn primary 30 to 45 days wet life 
Li-ion (liquid), NiMH, NiCd 5 years 
Li-ion (polymer) 3 years 
Ag-Zn rechargeable 3 years 
 
The service life is the performance a battery can provide in a certain application.  This is also 
affected by factors such as environment and usage.  For example, exposure to long periods of 
high temperatures will cause the batteries to exceed performance at the beginning of life due to 
the lowered internal resistance at high temperatures but will reduce their service life rapidly due 
to the decomposition of active materials.   The service life depends on the application and the 
battery capacity.   For a primary battery, the capacity of the battery should be chosen to provide 
the required period of performance.  For example, if a primary battery is required to power a 
device continually, then the load on the battery and the period it is expected to provide that 
power should be taken into consideration to determine the size (capacity) of the battery.  When 
obtaining battery certification, both the load and the period of use that reflects the service life 
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required will have to be provided.  For rechargeable batteries, apart from the capacity factor, the 
service life is provided as cycle life, or the number of times it can be recharged.  This is 
dependent on the battery chemistry.  For example, some rechargeable silver-zinc batteries have a 
maximum cycle life of 30 cycles unless specified otherwise by the battery manufacturer.  Nickel-
metal hydride, nickel-cadmium, and lithium-ion (liquid electrolyte systems only) have a cycle 
life of greater than 500 cycles.  Lithium-ion batteries have been shown to provide from one 
thousand to tens of thousands of cycles in portable equipment and satellite systems, respectively.  
The service life of both primary and rechargeable may exceed the calendar life of the battery, 
and in those cases the calendar life becomes the limiting factor.   
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APPENDIX D: BATTERY DESIGN EVALUATION AND APPROVAL 
 
The process by which battery design and usage plans are reviewed and approved varies with 
each Center and from program to program.  This appendix will be used to collect examples of 
processes used within example programs.  It is merely intended as guidelines of how the 
approval process can be conducted. 
 
D.1  Example JSC Processes 
 
Battery approval should be provided via a signed battery evaluation form (e.g., ISS_EP-03 for 
NASA Safety Panels).  The only exception to this is in cases where the battery is the main power 
supply for a space vehicle that is designed and flown by a prime contractor.  In this case, the 
responsible battery safety expert should verify that the design is safe through the appropriate 
safety panel review processes.  Approval of a battery design for a particular hardware or mission 
will not be construed as a general certification for all hardware and missions.  Approval of 
battery usage should be obtained for any new application of any approved hardware 
configuration and/or with each increase in scope of its certification.  The process for obtaining 
battery design evaluation and approval from JSC is detailed in JWI 8705.3.  The safety review 
process for the ISS and all the visiting vehicles is described in SSP 30599.  The safety review 
process for the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program is described in the CCTS-1140 and  
CCTS-1130 documents.  The Payload Safety Review policy and data submittal requirements are 
provided in NSTS 1700.7B (ISS Addendum) and NSTS/ISS 13830. 
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APPENDIX E: REQUIREMENTS MATRIX 
 
Requirement 
Number 
Requirement Language Section Page Number 
1.1 Evaluation of the design and verification program results 
shall be completed prior to certification for flight and 
ground operations. 
1.0 Introduction;  
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
1 
1.3 To be compliant to the requirements herein, every battery 
design, along with its safety verification program, its 
ground and/or on-orbit usage plans, and its post-flight 
processing shall be evaluated and approved by the 
appropriate technical review panel in the given program 
or project.   
1.0 Introduction;  
1.3 Battery Design Evaluation 
and Approval 
2 
4.1.1a Battery systems for crewed spacecraft shall implement 
failure tolerance as the preferred approach to control all 
catastrophic hazard causes. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.1 Failure Tolerance 
12 
4.1.1b The level of failure tolerance shall be the product of an 
integrated design and safety analysis but shall be a 
minimum of one. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.1 Failure Tolerance 
12 
4.1.2a The DFMR approach shall be used to address 
catastrophic battery hazards that cannot practically be 
controlled by a failure tolerance approach 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.2 Design for Minimum 
Risk 
13 
4.2.1a All cell and battery designs considered for flight shall 
first undergo evaluation testing to characterize the 
performance and safety of the flight battery design. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.1 
Engineering Evaluation 
13 
4.2.1b Evaluation testing shall, at a minimum, consist of 
characterizing the cell and battery safety under abuse 
conditions of overcharge, over-discharge into reversal, 
external short circuit and cell internal short circuit, 
temperature tolerance, vent and burst pressure 
determination and for custom batteries (greater than 20 
Wh), cell destructive physical analysis.  
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.1 
Engineering Evaluation 
14 
4.2.1c Evaluation testing shall confirm manufacturer’s 
specifications that are relevant to the project, as well as 
confirm that the cell and/or battery design can handle 
unique requirements levied by the project. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.1 
Engineering Evaluation 
14 
4.2.2a Qualification testing shall be performed to the worst-case 
relevant flight environments with margin. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.2 
Qualification Testing 
14 
4.2.2b Environmental tests shall include, at a minimum, extreme 
temperature exposures, vacuum, and vibration tests. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.2 
Qualification Testing 
14 
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Requirement 
Number 
Requirement Language Section Page Number 
4.2.2c Flight cell lot destructive testing shall consume a 
randomly selected sample size that is, at minimum, 3 
percent of the flight lot size or three cells, whichever is 
greater for each destructive test. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.2 
Qualification Testing 
15 
4.2.2d The operation of cell safety devices, if used as a control 
at the battery level, shall be verified by a qualification 
test at the battery level or at a level that accurately 
simulates the level at which the control is required to 
confirm the operation of the safety device.  
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.2 
Qualification Testing 
15 
4.2.2e Qualification testing shall be performed at the battery 
level, using flight equivalent builds. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.2 
Qualification Testing 
15 
4.2.3a All cell lots intended for custom flight batteries shall 
undergo 100-percent acceptance screening that includes, 
at minimum, visual inspection, mass, OCV retention, 
alternating current (AC) and/or direct current (DC) 
resistance, and capacity (for rechargeable chemistries) or 
load check (for primary chemistries). 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.3 
Acceptance Testing 
16 
4.2.3b All of the batteries intended for flight shall undergo flight 
acceptance (nondestructive) testing, which will include 
an evaluation of OCV, mass, capacity (for rechargeable 
chemistries) or load check (for primaries), internal 
resistance, visual inspection, vibration to flight 
acceptance levels, and thermal/vacuum testing.  
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, and 
Acceptance Testing; 4.2.3 
Acceptance Testing 
16 
4.3.1a Custom cell and battery designs intended for flight shall 
only be procured from vendors with approved 
configuration control processes. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.3 
Manufacturing Quality; 4.3.1 
Configuration Control 
17 
4.3.2a Any new battery lot and/or cell date code shall be 
assumed to be a new design and require a repeat of all 
battery and/or cell lot qualification testing and mitigation 
measures specified in Section 4.2.2. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.3 
Manufacturing Quality; 4.3.2 
Subsequent Flight Lot Testing 
17 
4.3.2b Subsequent flight cell lot destructive testing shall 
confirm that subsequent lot performance and safety 
features are the same as that of the original qualification 
lot. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.3 
Manufacturing Quality; 4.3.2 
Subsequent Flight Lot Testing 
17 
4.4.1a The electrical interconnections that form the pack 
through the interconnection of cells shall be made of 
low-resistance connections such that ohmic heating at the 
design load presents no over-temperature hazard. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.1 
Electrical Interconnection 
18 
4.4.1b The means of interconnection (i.e., mechanical fasteners, 
tack weld, etc.) and its verification shall ensure that the 
flight environments and usage profile do not reduce the 
effectiveness of the connection. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.1 
Electrical Interconnection 
18 
4.4.2a Wiring used within the flight battery shall adhere to 
Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests described in 
JSC-STD-8080.5 E-24 or be certified via an equivalent 
standard. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.2 
Electrical Wiring 
18 
4.4.3a For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes due to cell under/over voltage, monitoring shall be 
provided in order to detect and control hazardous 
under/over voltage of any cell in the battery. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and Cell 
Monitoring 
19 
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4.4.3b For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes due to high currents, battery-level current 
monitoring shall be provided in order to detect and 
control hazardous currents in the battery. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and Cell 
Monitoring 
19 
4.4.3c For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes due to high/low temperatures, temperature 
monitoring shall be provided to detect and control 
hazardous temperatures at any cell in the battery. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and Cell 
Monitoring 
19 
4.4.3d For custom battery designs with catastrophic failure 
modes, instrumentation shall collect data during use and 
during charge and be reviewable on the ground for use in 
trending and/or post anomaly analysis. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and Cell 
Monitoring 
19 
4.4.4a For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, cell 
performance matching prior to battery assembly shall be 
performed to mitigate state-of-charge (SOC) imbalances 
that could adversely affect battery performance and/or 
safety. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.4 
Cell Matching 
19 
4.4.4b For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, 
cells shall be matched in a battery based on charge 
retention, internal resistance and/or AC impedance, and 
ampere-hour capacity (for rechargeable chemistries). 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.4 
Cell Matching 
19 
4.4.5a For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, 
software-based controls responsible for managing the 
charge/discharge of the battery shall operate inside a safe 
envelope maintained by active or passive hardware-based 
controls and guards. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.5 
Dissimilar Controls 
20 
4.4.5b For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, in 
cases where software-based controls are not enveloped 
by hardware controls, the software is safety critical and 
its development shall include conventional software 
assurance processes and confidence not based solely on 
integrated testing.  
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 General 
Design Requirements; 4.4.5 
Dissimilar Controls 
20 
4.5a During the preparation phase for on-orbit processing, the 
hardware owner shall provide details for safe operation 
of the hardware on-orbit, any on-orbit processing that 
may be required, and safe stowage or disposal. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.5 Mission 
Usage 
20 
4.5b The hardware owner shall establish on-orbit processes 
and operational constraints in coordination with the 
mission controllers for the hardware. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.5 Mission 
Usage 
20 
4.5c For the custom lithium-ion battery designs that are 
greater than 12 volts (V) and  
60 Wh and required to be used in a crewed environment 
for more than 1 year or for multiple missions requiring 
launch and landing, the health of the battery shall be 
monitored to allow insight into changes that could lead to 
a catastrophic failure. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.5 Mission 
Usage 
20 
4.6a A post-flight performance evaluation of the hardware and 
the batteries shall be conducted when hardware is 
returned post-flight. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.6 Post-flight 
Cell and Pack Evaluation 
21 
4.6b For cells and batteries installed in hardware during return 
flight, after the post-flight evaluation, the cells and 
battery pack shall be removed so that the equipment may 
be stored without the cells and pack installed. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.6 Post-flight 
Cell and Pack Evaluation 
21 
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4.7a The hardware developer or provider shall establish 
protocols and controls to address identified hazards and 
document those processes in the safety data package 
prepared for the system. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements 
21 
4.7.1a Sufficient ventilation shall be provided when processing 
non-sealed batteries to ensure that the concentrations of 
electrolyte vapors, combustible gases, or toxic gases do 
not reach 50 percent of the lower exposure limit (LEL). 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements; 
4.7.1 Requirements for 
Ground Handling and 
Transportation 
21 
4.7.1b Ground handling and transportation shall be in 
accordance with JPR 1700.1, “JSC Safety and Health 
Handbook,” or equivalent standards. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements; 
4.7.1 Requirements for 
Ground Handling and 
Transportation 
21 
4.7.2a GSE for batteries shall be designed such that the 
combination of the battery and GSE does not reduce the 
level of failure tolerance intended in the flight battery 
design. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements; 
4.7.2 Design and Operations 
Requirements for Ground 
Support Equipment 
22 
4.8a Shelf and service life of batteries shall be tracked. 4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.8 Shelf and 
Service Life Related 
Requirements 
23 
5.0a The possible sources of battery hazards shall be 
identified for each battery design while considering the 
entire set of mission phases and conditions. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls 
24 
5.0b Each hazard shall be evaluated to determine applicability 
and to identify all sources, which can be broadly 
categorized as inadequate design, poor workmanship, 
and/or abuse (electrical, mechanical, and/or thermal). 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls 
24 
5.0c The hazard severity shall be categorized as catastrophic, 
critical, or non-critical. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls 
24 
5.1.1.1a Design of the hardware shall limit accumulation of 
hydrogen in enclosed spaces containing oxygen to less 
than 2 percent of the total free-space volume. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
25 
5.1.1.1b Electrolyte absorbing materials used in battery designs 
shall be nonflammable or flame retardant. 
 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
25 
5.1.1.1c The battery enclosure and cells shall prevent excessive 
pressure buildup due to gas accumulation. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
25 
5.1.1.1d Relief valves and vents used as controls for the 
accumulation of excessive pressure shall be tested. 
 
 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
25 
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5.1.1.1e If the battery cell enclosure failure mode is demonstrated 
to be leak-before-burst, then the ratio of failure pressure 
to vent pressure shall be a minimum of 1.5:1. 
 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
26 
5.1.1.1f All other cell enclosures shall demonstrate a minimum 
ratio of failure pressure to vent pressure of 2.5:1. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
26 
5.1.1.1g Cells that do not meet the 1.5:1 ratio shall not be used for 
manned space applications. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.1 
Sources – Chemical Reaction; 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – 
Chemical Reaction 
26 
5.1.2.1a The battery/charger design shall maintain required failure 
tolerance against overcharge/over-discharge failure. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1b Operational procedures shall ensure that the battery is not 
operated outside limits recommended by the cell/battery 
pack manufacturer or that established during 
qualification testing. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1c The charger shall be designed for the specific type of 
battery being used and incorporate the necessary charge 
termination controls 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1d Inadvertent charging of primary batteries shall be 
prevented 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1e Uncontrolled charging of secondary batteries shall be 
prevented. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
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5.1.2.1f Charger circuit schematic shall be reviewed and 
evaluated for required failure tolerance. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1g For external chargers, the specification document for the 
charger shall be used as guidance for the development of 
in-flight charging procedures. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1h If it can lead to a hazardous condition, the charger shall 
be designed to stop charging the battery after a set period 
of time to prevent continuous balancing charge discharge 
loops. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1i Operational tolerances of the charger shall not exceed the 
safe operating range of the cell or battery. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.2.1j Operational protocols programmed into battery chargers 
used on spacecraft shall have safety limits specified. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.2 
Sources – Overcharge 
Failure/Over-discharge 
Failure; 5.1.2.1 Requirements 
– Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
27 
5.1.3.1a External shorts to the battery shall be controlled using a 
combination of preventive controls. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
28 
5.1.3.1b Controls for battery external shorts shall be tested at the 
appropriate and relevant battery configuration in the 
relevant environment. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
28 
5.1.3.1c The battery packs shall be tested for shorts (bypassing all 
battery level current limiters) of the low and high 
impedance types and provide protection controls 
accordingly.  
5. General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
29 
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5.1.3.1d 
 
The surfaces of battery terminals on the outside of the 
battery case shall be protected from accidental bridging. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
29 
5.1.3.1e All inner surfaces of metal battery enclosures shall be 
anodized and/or coated with a non-electrically 
conductive electrolyte-resistant paint to prevent a 
subsequent short circuit hazard. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
29 
5.1.3.1f Battery and cell terminals shall be protected from contact 
with other conductive surfaces. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
29 
5.1.3.1g Battery terminals that pass through metal battery 
enclosures shall be insulated from the case by an 
insulating collar or other effective means. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
30 
5.1.3.1h Wires inside the battery case shall be insulated, 
restrained from contact with cell terminals, protected 
against chafing, and physically constrained from 
movement due to vibration or shock. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
30 
5.1.3.1i Adjacent insulative barriers such as layers, wraps, and 
coatings shall be unlike in design and material properties. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
30 
5.1.3.1j In battery designs greater than 50 Vdc, corona-induced 
short circuits (high-voltage-induced gas breakdown) shall 
be prevented. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.3 
Sources – External Short 
Circuit; 5.1.3.1 Requirements 
– External Short Circuit 
30 
5.1.4.1a Cells used in COTS batteries or cells selected for a 
custom battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity 
of an internal short circuit event. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.4 
Sources – Internal Short 
Circuit Failure; 5.1.4.1 
Requirements – Internal Short 
Circuit 
31 
5.1.4.1b Measures shall be taken to reduce the likelihood and/or 
severity of an internal short circuit event to a level 
acceptable to the program/project. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.4 
Sources – Internal Short 
Circuit Failure; 5.1.4.1 
Requirements – Internal Short 
Circuit 
32 
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5.1.5.1a For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy 
employing high specific energy cells (greater than 80 
watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with 
catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated 
to ascertain the severity of a worst-case single-cell 
thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design 
to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended 
application and environment. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.5 
Sources – Thermal Runaway 
Propagation; 5.1.5.1 
Requirements – Thermal 
Runaway Propagation 
34 
5.1.5.1b The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and 
test to quantify the severity (consequence) of the event in 
the intended application and environment as well as to 
identify design modifications to the battery or the system 
that could appreciably reduce that severity. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 5.1.5 
Sources – Thermal Runaway 
Propagation; 5.1.5.1 
Requirements – Thermal 
Runaway Propagation 
34 
5.2.1.1a Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe 
after exposure to required vibration environments (e.g., 
SSP 41172, SSP 52005). 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.1 
Chemical Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 5.2.1.1 
Requirements – Mechanical 
Failure 
35 
5.2.1.1b Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe 
after exposure to required shock environments. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.1 
Chemical Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 5.2.1.1 
Requirements – Mechanical 
Failure 
35 
5.2.1.1c Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe 
after exposure to required atmospheric/vacuum 
environments. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.1 
Chemical Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 5.2.1.1 
Requirements – Mechanical 
Failure 
35 
5.2.1.1d Cell and battery enclosure materials shall be compatible 
and ensure that the material strength and function are 
maintained after exposure to electrolyte liquids and 
gases/vapors, painted coatings, potting materials and 
their solvents, cleaning solutions, and cell case sealing 
materials and their solvents. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.1 
Chemical Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 5.2.1.1 
Requirements – Mechanical 
Failure 
35 
5.2.2.1a A welded seal construction without softgood seals shall 
be used for all Li-SO2 and oxyhalide battery chemistries 
and be provided with a rupture disk or equivalent 
pressure-relief mechanism to provide for a leak-before-
burst design. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
 
 
5.2.2.1b Cells with highly toxic or lethal electrolytes (greater than 
toxicology category 2), such as those in Li-BCX, Li-
SOCl2, Li-SO2Cl2, and Li-SO2, shall not be used in or 
vented into habitable volumes. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
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5.2.2.1c Cell seals shall be 100-percent leaked tested at flight cell 
and/or flight battery level. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1d Cell seal design shall have positive margins over cell 
vent pressures, as specified in 5.1.1.1e-g. 
 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1e Cells with welded seals shall follow the requirement 
stated in AWS C7.4/C7.4M:2008. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1f Electrolyte absorbent material, containment, and/or a 
tortuous path for the exit of liquid electrolyte from the 
battery enclosure shall be used in the design. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1g All internal surfaces of a metal battery enclosure shall be 
anodized and/or coated with a non-electrically 
conductive electrolyte-resistant paint to prevent a 
subsequent short circuit hazard as a result of electrolyte 
leakage. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1h Vent holes in the battery enclosure, if present, shall be 
covered with a gas permeable/liquid impermeable or 
electrolyte absorbent, nonflammable material to trap 
released liquid electrolyte. 
 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1i The seals of cell and battery designs shall be verified to 
work at worst-case mission operating conditions. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
36 
5.2.2.1j Cells with welded seal construction may also be enclosed 
in sealed containers.  If the sealed container is used as a 
control for fault tolerance to a catastrophic hazard, it 
shall be verified with test. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
37 
5.2.2.1k If a container with a welded seal construction is used to 
contain toxic gas from being released into a habitable 
volume, then the sealed container shall be compliant with 
NASA-STD-5019 or an equivalent standard. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.2 Chemical 
Exposure Hazards; 5.2.2 
Sources – Seals and Vents; 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals 
and Vents 
37 
5.3.1.1a Batteries exceeding 40 Vdc shall provide hazard controls 
as specified in NASA-STD-3001. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.3 Electrical 
Hazards; 5.3.1 Sources of 
Electrical Shock, Corona, and 
Arc-Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
37 
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5.3.1.1b Batteries exceeding 100 Vdc shall be assessed for arc-
flash hazards. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.3 Electrical 
Hazards; 5.3.1 Sources of 
Electrical Shock, Corona, and 
Arc-Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
37 
5.3.1.1c In battery designs where analysis shows an arc-flash risk, 
arc flash and shock personal protective equipment shall 
be employed when working in or around the battery. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.3 Electrical 
Hazards; 5.3.1 Sources of 
Electrical Shock, Corona, and 
Arc-Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
37 
5.3.1.1d External shorts shall be controlled as documented in 
Section 5.1.3. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.3 Electrical 
Hazards; 5.3.1 Sources of 
Electrical Shock, Corona, and 
Arc-Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
37 
5.3.1.1e Corona mitigation designs shall be incorporated as stated 
in JSC 29129 for high-voltage batteries used in a vacuum 
environment. 
 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.3 Electrical 
Hazards; 5.3.1 Sources of 
Electrical Shock, Corona, and 
Arc-Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
37 
5.3.2.1a Batteries employed as the sole source of energy for 
critical safety systems shall be assessed for loss-of-power 
hazard. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.3 Electrical 
Hazards; 5.3.2 Sources of 
Loss of Power; 5.3.2.1 
Requirements 
38 
5.4.2a Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled during all 
mission phases to ensure that the crew is protected from 
extreme touch temperatures. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.4 Extreme 
Temperature Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
38 
5.4.2b Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled and verified 
via test at worst-case mission environments to ensure that 
all cell temperatures remain within safe operating ranges 
specified by the manufacturer or verified by tests. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.4 Extreme 
Temperature Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
39 
5.4.2c External short circuits shall be controlled for the cells 
and battery assembly, as discussed in Section 5.1.3, to 
prevent heat generation resulting from high rates of 
discharge. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.4 Extreme 
Temperature Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
39 
5.4.2d Validated thermal analysis and testing shall be performed 
to confirm that the battery cells will not be exposed to 
temperatures below the manufacturer’s rating or the limit 
established by qualification tests. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.4 Extreme 
Temperature Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
39 
5.4.2e Thermal extremes due to thermal runaway propagation 
shall be addressed as discussed in Section 5.1.5. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.4 Extreme 
Temperature Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
39 
5.4.2f Battery heaters shall be designed with appropriate levels 
of failure tolerance to prevent excessive heating of the 
battery and/or cells. 
5.0 General Battery Hazards 
and Controls; 5.4 Extreme 
Temperature Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
39 
 
